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IN DEFENSE OF THE “DUTY TO REPORT” CRIMES
Sungyong Kang1
I. INTRODUCTION
“If you see something, say something.” This common phrase is found on
posters all over New York City subways. The campaign, originally implemented
by the New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority, is now licensed to
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to encourage the general public to
report suspicious activity to local law enforcement. 2 So, are members of the
general public required to report suspicious activity to law enforcement agencies
when they see it? If they don’t, will they be punished? Is there a legal duty for
passersby to report suspicious activity or crime? Although the crime of
misprision, under 18 U.S.C. § 4, seems to require the general public to report
felonies, it only criminalizes the more affirmative act of concealment, as opposed
to simple non-reporting.3 Are there circumstances, however, where one should be
required to report the suspicious activity or crime under the threat of criminal
liability?
Should a victim of a serious crime be criminalized for not reporting the
crime? Should a victim have a duty to report the crime? Most people would
probably answer negatively; the majority would say it is wrong to criminalize
those who fail to report crimes, particularly the victims themselves. What about
civil or administrative penalties for the victims of crimes, instead of criminal
punishment? The answer would probably still be “no,” but likely less resolutely.
Must a rape victim report the rape to the police? The answer would absolutely be
“no.” What about a victim of larceny? What if the stolen object contained
dangerous chemicals or weapons of mass destruction? What if the victim knew
that the thief was part of a terrorist organization? Even for victims of the same
type of crime, the answers could vary depending on specific situational factors.
The same normative contextual dependence for reporting crimes by victims
applies to third parties and even to offenders. Indeed, the position of a potential
reporter in relation to the crime is a crucial factor in determining the immorality
of not reporting or the morality of reporting.
With the division of labor and interdependency of social activities, the
importance of administrative laws and agencies ensuring each profession
“behave[s] ethically for common social and economic welfare” has
increased.4Thus, the government has introduced laws regulating serious unethical

1

S.J.D. Fordham University School of Law, 2017.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY HOMEPAGE,http://www.dhs.gov/see-something-saysomething/about-campaign (last visited May 25, 2016).
3See 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2017) (“Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known
the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”); Neal v. U.S., 102 F.2d
643 (8th Cir. 1939).
4SeeJohn M. Pfiffner, The Development of Administrative Regulation, 221 THE ANNALS OF THE AM.
ACAD. OF POL. SCI. 1, 2-3 (John Horlacher ed., 1942); see also WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW
2 U.S.
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behaviors in certain professions and industries. To more effectively deter crime,
professional ethics require individuals to report crimes encountered in the course
of one’s business.
The private sector’s role in society has become so essential that laws now
compel a wider range of private actors to behave more proactively, under the
threat of stronger penalties. Often, the private sector is better positioned to
control the behavior of possible criminals, considering the crimes are occurring
in modern fields, such as technology and financial services. Private industry is
becoming increasingly regulated. Duties to report and, in some cases, to
proactively deter crime, are now common in certain fields.5 Perpetrators, victims,
and third-parties could all have an obligation to report crime. Moreover, failing to
do so could result in a crime of omission.
Not all behavior, even marginally immoral behavior, should be regulated
and criminalized. However, focus on instrumental incentives for crime deterrence
has led to the neglect of traditional, culpability-based limits in criminal
punishment, thereby eroding the value of fairness and proportionality.
In current legal academia, normative theory for the crime of failure to
report crime, an emerging type of white collar crime,6 has not kept pace with
modern laws and regulations. 7 As crime deterrence continues to rely on the
FREEDOM 23-24 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1961) (1913) (illustrating when the
government has a right to intervene with the private sector).
5 Third parties, as gatekeepers, monitor and disrupt misconduct. See Reiner H. Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
6 I adopt, for the purpose of this research, the following definition of white collar crime: “Any
behavior that occurs in a corporate and/or individual occupational context; and, that is committed
for personal and/or corporate gain; and/or, violates the trust associated with that individual’s and/or
corporation’s position and/or status; and that is a violation of any criminal law, civil law,
administrative law, rule, ruling, norm, or regulation condemning the behavior.” ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WHITE-COLLAR & CORPORATE CRIME, at viii (Lawrence M. Salinger ed., SAGE Publications 1st
ed., 2004).
7 Current scholarship has focused mainly on a specific duty to report crime, such as the crime of
misprision or duty to report child abuse, elder abuse, etc. See Goldberg, Misprision of Felony: An
Old Concept in a New Context, 52 A.B.A. J. 148 (1966); Robert E. Meale, Misprision of Felony: A
Crime Whose Time Has Come, Again, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 199 (1975); Howard, Misprisions,
Compoundings and Compromises, 1959 CRIM. L. REV. 750 (1959); Jack Wenik, Forcing the
Bystander to Get Involved: A Case for a Statute Requiring Witnesses to Report Crime, 94 YALE L.
J. 1787 (1985); Susan J. Hoffman, Statues Establishing a Duty To Report Crimes or Render
Assistance to Strangers-Making Apathy Criminal, 72 KY. L.J. 827 (1984); Natalie Perrin-Smith
Vance, My Brother's Keeper? The Criminalization of Nonfeasance: A Constitutional Analysis of
Duty to Report Statutes, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 135 (1999), Robert D. Miller and Robert Weinstock,
Conflict of interest between therapist-patient confidentiality and the duty to report sexual abuse of
children, BEHAV. SCI. LAW, 5: 161 (1987); Lawrence R. Faulkner, Mandating the Reporting of
Suspected Cases of Elder Abuse: An Inappropriate, Ineffective and Ageist Response to the Abuse of
Older Adults, 16 FAM. L. Q. 69 (1982); Robert J. Shoop, Lynn M. Firestone, Mandatory Reporting
of Suspected Child Abuse: Do Teachers Obey the Law?, 46 EDUC. L. REP. 1115 (1988). Research
covering duty-to-report is limited and few papers provide guidance on how to enact duty-to-report
laws. See Ayling & Grabosky, Policing By Command: Enhancing Law Enforcement Capacity
Through Coercion, 28 LAW & POLICY 420 (2006); see also Sandra Guerra Thompson, The White
Collar Police Force “Duty to Report” Statues in Criminal Law Theory, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 3 (2002). However, even these papers fail to comprehensively reflect the current state of duty-to-
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private sector, I expect a growing number of “duty to report” requirements in
other professions and industries. Without clear principles, derived from a
comprehensive study of duty to report laws and regulations, there is a substantial
risk that these laws and regulations will be incoherent and imbalanced, resulting
in a more unjust society.
My research aims to provide a theoretical framework to enhance our
understanding of the laws on duty to report crimes. Adopting a culpability
analysis, this paper identifies normative culpability factors to be considered in
measuring the culpability of failing to report crime, suggests the position of the
reporter in relation to the crime reported—offenders, third-parties, or victims—as
a criterion for categorizing the diverse duties to report crimes, and analyzes the
culpability of failing to report crimes in each category of the laws using the
normative culpability factors.8Further, this study will provide substantive
principles for each category of duty-to-report laws which should be considered,
yet remain largely unexamined. This analysis will help modify contemporary
laws criminalizing the failure to report crimes that are imperative if such laws are
to be morally justifiable.
Enacting laws that properly express our moral code will eventually
encourage compliance and decrease enforcement costs.
II. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS
This paper examines diverse laws imposing regulatory duties on certain
professions and industries to report crimes under the threat of criminal penalties.
As explained in the following chapters, the culpability of not reporting crime
depends significantly on the position of the reporter vis-a-vis the crime reported
and allows for a meaningful categorization framework. Therefore, the analysis
will focus on the following categories of duty-to-report laws in the U.S.: (1)
offender reporter,9 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (duty to report the release of substances
from a vessel by the person in charge of vessel);10 (2) third-party reporter, 18
report by focusing mostly on duty-to-report imposed on a third party and providing unsatisfactory,
one-size-fits-all guidelines.
8 As the necessary normative culpability factors differ depending on the proscribed behaviors, it is
impossible to make a culpability analysis for a general law where proscribed behaviors could vary.
In contrast, this paper makes a culpability analysis by specifically focusing on a type of
administrative law – those laws which determine whether there is a duty to report crime, and the
extent to which it extends. This area is general enough to be applied to many different laws
requiring such duty but specific enough to be analyzed deeply.
9 “Offender-reporter”, as used here, means only the person, including a legal entity, with possible
strict vicarious criminal liability for such entity, not the person who commits or aids and abets the
underlying crime with general criminal liability. To differentiate between these two types of
offenders, I use “Offender” for the former and “Primary Offender” for the latter. Also, Offender
does not include a person who has no liability in relation to the crime committed within their
organization. As only the person who can control and oversee the behavior of Primary Offender
bears possible strict vicarious criminal liability, a person without such control or oversight will be
considered a third party.
10See42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)(2) (2017).
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U.S.C. § 2258A (duty to report child pornography by electronic communication
service providers and remote computing service providers);11 (3) victim reporter,
32 C.F.R. Part 236,12 authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 391 (duty to report cyber
incidents by Department of Defense contractors); The Personal Data Protection
and Breach Accountability Act of 201413 and Identity Theft Protection Act of
North Carolina 14 (duty to report data breaches by various industries). The
analysis also examines 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (g), 15 31 U.S.C. § 5322 16 and the
corresponding regulations,17 which impose a duty to report suspicious activity by
financial institutions as an offender, victim, and third party reporter. In addition,
several duty-to-report laws that do not criminalize non-compliance will be
examined for comparison.
This paper will not focus on laws that require the reporting of
misconduct within an organization as opposed to those that require reporting to
law enforcement18 or on laws that encourage but do not mandate reporting.19
III. METHODS
A. Culpability Analysis
Fairness requires proportionality. 20 The concepts of fairness and
proportionality are central to many areas of law but particularly to the criminal
law. Deprivation of liberty and social stigma are but two serious consequences of

11

18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a) (2017); 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(e) (2017).
32 C.F.R. § 236.1 (2017). This part requires all Department of Defense contractors to rapidly
report cyber incidents involving covered defense information on their covered contractor
information systems or cyber incidents affecting the contractor’s ability to provide operationally
critical support.
13 The Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2014 introduced, but not
enacted, by Senator Richard Blumenthal (D – Ct)., imposes criminal penalties on those who
intentionally or willingly fail to report a security breach including fines and/or prison term up to
five years. See S. 1995, 113th Cong. (2014), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senatebill/1995.
14N.C. GEN. STAT. §75-65 (2017). In the event a business provides notice to an affected person
pursuant to this section, the business shall notify, without unreasonable delay, the Consumer
Protection Division of the Attorney General's Office of the nature of the breach, the number of
consumers affected by the breach, steps taken to investigate the breach, steps taken to prevent a
similar breach in the future, and information regarding the timing, distribution, and content of the
notice. N.C. GEN. STAT. §75-13 (2017).
15 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2017).
16 31 U.S.C.(a)-(b) § 5322 (2017).
17 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c) (2017).
18 SeeSection 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7245
(2017)); 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2017).
19SeeSection 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78U-6 (2017)); False
Claim Act (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2017)).
20 Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME & JUSTICE 55,
68 (1992).
12
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criminal conviction, and necessitate careful consideration of all factors before
imposing such liability. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the U.S.
Constitution reflects this concept in relation to criminal punishment.21 Thus, only
those who deserve such consequences should be subject to the criminal law. How
then do we decide who those are? Serious consequences proportional to what? In
The Aims of the Criminal Law, Hart argues that:
[I]t is necessary to be able to say in good conscience in each instance in
which a criminal sanction is imposed for a violation of law that the
violation was blameworthy and, hence, deserving of the moral
condemnation of the community. 22

The concept of culpability, which is “more or less synonymous with
moral blameworthiness,” is required to analyze whether the law imposing a
criminal penalty is just.23
However, increased focus on instrumental incentive for crime
deterrence 24 has led to a neglect of traditional, culpability-based limits on
criminal punishment.25 The value of fairness and proportionality has been eroded.
Various limitations on government power imposed by the Constitution have
become meaningless.26
This paper does not argue that instrumentalism is intrinsically wrong, but
proposes moral instrumentalism as a more viable solution. To instill these lost
principles back into our criminal law, this paper adopts culpability analysis and
analyzes the justifiability of criminalizing the failure to report crime.
B. Double Bases on Culpability Analysis
1. Distinctive Characteristics of Laws on “Duty to Report” Crimes
Unlike other regulatory crimes, the crime of failure-to-report resembles
mala in se rather than mala prohibita allowing moral culpability analysis to be
applied.
The trend of blurring the distinction between criminal law and
administrative law has intensified. Traditionally, administrative law aims to

21U.S.

CONST. amend. VIII.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 412 (1958),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1190221.pdf?_=1465607771416.
23 Mitchell N. Berman, Introduction: Punishment and Culpability, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 441, 441
(2012).
24 See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897)
(promoting the value of power and efficiency instead of traditional morality as bases of law).
25See John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653,
656-57
(2013),
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7435&context=jclc.
26SeeId.
22
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protect the public in a prospective manner by regulating the behavior of specific
subjects and by preventing potential harm.27 Criminal law, on the other hand,
operates retrospectively mainly by punishing morally proscribed, harmful 28
wrongdoings 29 after they occur. However, over time, criminal law and
administrative law have begun to overlap: administrative law increasingly uses
criminal penalties for certain regulatory violations, 30 and criminal law has
expanded its scope to prohibit behaviors that do not cause harm 31 or those
committed without criminal mens rea.32

27 See Pfiffner, supra note 3, at 4 (citing Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. No. 8, at 13 (1st Sess. 1941)) (“the administrative body is
charged with preventing controversies from coming before it, by eliminating at the source the
causes of such action.”).
28 Whether the act must be both immoral and harmful for it to qualify as “crime” is a longstanding
controversy. This paper sides with the argument that the criminal act should be both immoral and
harmful. The question of what constitutes harm is another hotly debated issue. Does immoral
behavior itself cause harm? Can risk of harm be regarded as a harm? Does harm include only harm
to a person or to property, or also harm to society in general? Leaving these interesting questions
aside, this paper assumes that criminal acts are those that cause actual harm to people, property, or
society, not the risk of harm.
29 Although the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita is controversial, this article
chooses to follow the distinction that: “Mala in se . . . are crimes consisting in conduct that is wrong
independently of the criminal law—that would have been wrong even had there been no criminal
law. Mala prohibita, on the other hand, consists of conduct that is not wrongful independently of
the law that prohibits it: if they are wrong, their wrongfulness depends essentially on their
illegality.” Theories of Criminal Law, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (May 14, 2013),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/criminal-law/.
30 See generally Ronald A. Cass, Overcriminalization: Administrative Regulation, Prosecutorial
Discretion, and the Rule of Law, 15 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’YPRAC. GROUPS (2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2520533; John G. Malcom, The Problem with Criminal Regulations, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/08/criminallaw-and-the-administrative-state-the-problem-with-criminal-regulations.
31 See Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1139
(1973), http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol61/iss5/1 (“persons will be
punished for what they say rather than for what they do”); see also generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr.,
Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y715 (2013); DOUGLAS
HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2009).
32See Brian W. Walsh & Tiffany M. Joslyn, Without Intent: How Congress Is Eroding the Criminal
Intent Requirement in Federal Law, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION AND THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS (2010), https://www.nacdl.org/report/withoutintent/PDF/ (“This
study revealed that offenses with inadequate mens rea requirements are ubiquitous at all stages of
the legislative process [in the 109th Congress in 2005 and 2006]: Over 57 percent of the offenses
introduced, and 64 percent of those enacted into law, contained inadequate mens rea requirements,
putting the innocent at risk of criminal punishment.”); See also generally Arthur Leavens, Beyond
Blame—Mens Rea and Regulatory Crime, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L.R. 1 (2007); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Does Unlawful Mean Criminal?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in
American Law, 71 B.U.L. Rev. 193 (1991); MENS REA, PUBIC WELFARE OFFENSES, AND THE
RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE, WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION 1-1,
http://www.wlf.org/upload/Chapter1MensRea.pdf. This trend is not directly related to duty-toreport crimes, as such crimes criminalize a knowing or intentional failure to report crime. However,
this trend allows a concept of offender-reporter in this paper to remain possible. Seesupra note 8.
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This trend has caused a drawback of over-criminalization. As properly
pointed out by Husak, “the proliferation of mala prohibita [has caused]
exponential growth in the size and scope of the criminal law today.” 33 It is
difficult to know the exact number of mala prohibita in existence, 34 thereby
increasing the risk of punishing the innocent.35
Although failure to report crime is malum prohibitum, it has certain
characteristics, illustrated below, which place it closer to intrinsically wrongful
acts on the criminal law spectrum.
One can differentiate a duty to report crime, enacted to assist law
enforcement,36 from other regulatory duties whose only connection to criminal
law is the use of criminal penalties to further compliance. 37 A duty to report
serves both regulatory and criminal law purposes. As with many regulatory
duties, such laws require some industries and professions to act in a certain
way—here, by reporting crime—in order to protect the public from harm by
reducing the risk of the private sector being abused by criminals. At the same
time, by requiring reporting by those in the best position to detect harmful
wrongdoings, a duty to report crime leads to increased detection of wrongdoings,
thus achieving retribution-rehabilitation 38 along with general and specific
deterrence of crime.39
In addition, unlike general mala prohibita, which is difficult to morally
justify, the crime of failing to report is morally proscribed. Generally, regulatory
breaches, such as signal violations, speeding, or drunk driving, are wrongful acts
only because the law says so. After all, running a remote stop sign in broad
daylight with no other drivers for miles around is completely blameless but for

33

Husak, supra note 30, at 104.
Malcom, supra note 29 (“In fact, the regulations carrying criminal penalties have grown so
voluminous that nobody really knows how many there are. The total has been conservatively
estimated at over 300,000, with dozens or hundreds more being promulgated every year.”).
35 Walsh & Joslyn, supra note 31.
36 Thompson, supra note 6, at 35 (As Sandra Guerra Thompson explains, such regulations “turn
people of many professions . . . into a white collar police force.”).
37 Stinneford, supra note 24, at 657 (Legal instrumentalism says that “punishment could be used
purely as a form of regulation and that traditional culpability-based constraints on criminal
punishment should no longer apply.”).
38See Leavens, supra note 31, at 2 (Duty-to-report laws are different from other regulatory crimes
in that laws prohibiting regulatory crime or public welfare crime are enacted to protect the public,
not to detect and deter a specific criminal wrongdoing through punishment or rehabilitation). See
Hart, Jr., supra note 21, at 405 (“In traditional thought and speech, the ideas of crime and
punishment have been inseparable; the consequences of conviction for crime have been described
as a matter of course as ‘punishment’ . . . Today, ‘treatment’ has become a fashionable euphemism
for the older, ugly word.”). Duty-to-report laws serve a purpose of criminal law: to detect and deter
a specific criminal wrongdoing through punishment or rehabilitation.
39See Hart, Jr., supra note 21, at 401, 412-13. This paper takes “multivalued thinking” view rather
than “single-valued thinking” view of criminal law. From the point of view of legislatures who
“have to deal with crimes . . . in advance of their commission,” they consider not just specific
deterrence but also the other aims of criminal law including general deterrence, as “variety of aims
will coalesce, to the point of becoming virtually indistinguishable.”.
34
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the law prohibiting the running of any stop sign. On the contrary, intentionally
failing to report crime or doing nothing, when the cost of doing something is
minimal, is generally understood to be morally wrong. 40 All other things being
equal, committing crime is morally wrong, and reporting crime is morally right.
Lastly, non-compliance with one’s duty to report causes harm - the very
essence of the crime 41 - thereby distinguishing “criminal conduct from mere
immoral behavior.”42 Feinberg, refining Mill’s harm principle,43 argued that:
It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it
would probably be effective in preventing (eliminating,
reducing) harm to persons other than the actor (the one
prohibited from acting) and there is probably no other means that
is equally effective at no greater cost to other values.44
Only the culpable behaviors causing “social harm” should be penalized.45
Under the premise that the crime required to be reported causes such social harm
"negat[ing], endangering, or destruct[ing] . . . an individual, group, or state
interest, which [is] deemed socially valuable," 46 failure to report crime causes
harm by allowing the harm to materialize or to expand.

40 Reporting crime could be regarded as a type of aiding or rescuing endangered strangers. The
moral wrongfulness of failing to report crime is similar to the moral wrongfulness of failing to aid
or rescue endangered strangers. Legal theorists and practitioners have recognized aiding
endangered persons as a moral good, and failing to aid as a moral bad. J. H. Scheid, Affirmative
Duty to Aid in Emergency Situations, 3 J. MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. & PROC 1, 16 (1969) ("the Law
should . . . formally acknowledge the contemporary moral consensus that we are all necessarily
inter-dependent and that each member of society has a duty to aid his brother in danger.”); United
States v. Knowles, 26 F. Cas. 800 (N.D.Cal. 1846) ("It is undoubtedly the moral duty of every
person to extend to others assistance when in danger."). Thus, reporting a crime is a moral good
and failing to report crime is a moral bad.
41 Although the confrontation between legal liberalism and moralism, which is represented by the
Hart-Devlin debate, is still alive, this paper sides with legal liberalism as it requires a more strict
standard for criminalization. See generally, Joel Feinberg, Some Unswept Debris from the HartDevlin Debate, 72 SYNTHESE249 (1987); Gerald Dworkin, Devlin Was Right: Law and the
&
MARY
L.
REV.
927
(1999),
Enforcement
of
Morality,
40
WM.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss3/11. For liberalists, criminality requires harm. Hall
described harm as the "fulcrum between criminal conduct and the punitive sanction." HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 213 (2d ed. 1960). Edward Livingston argued that “[m]oral
guilt must be united to injury in order to justify punishment.” EDWARD LIVINGSTON, THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE 235 (1873).
42 Albin Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of the
Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQ. L. REV. 345, 346 (1965).
43 See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 25 HARV. CLASSICS, (Charles Eliot. ed, P.F. Collier & Sons,
1914), http://www.bartleby.com/25/2/1.html. (“That the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others.”).
44 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 26 (1987).
45 See Eser, supra note 41, at 413.
46 Id.
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While some regard the failure to report crime as harmless,47 this paper
concludes that simply allowing the harm to occur could also satisfy the
“causation of harm” element of criminalization. John Harris, in The Marxist
Conception of Violence, defended the idea that “men are causally responsible for
harm they could have prevented.”48 Similarly, H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore, in
Causation in the Law, recognize deviation from the usual routine as a cause of
subsequent harm which could have been prevented.49 Dressler, while denying
the justifiability of bad samaritan laws, acknowledged the justifiability of laws
criminalizing the failure to rescue when a bystander intended to allow harm to
occur.50 After all, in this instance, there is arguably a nexus between failing to
rescue and the ultimate harm.
When considering these characteristics, failing to report crime more
closely resembles mala in se, thereby planting it closer to the jurisdiction of the
criminal law than the administrative law. Though the boundary between the two
is not clear, the “moral culpability test” provides a valuable tool for analyzing
such regulatory duty. This test enables laws criminalizing a failure to report
crime to be managed in a controlled manner, within the limit of moral
culpability, thereby, avoiding over-criminalization and respecting the principles
of fairness and proportionality.
This moral culpability analysis should be carried out through a balancing
test. Even considering the distinctive characteristic of the criminal law, the duty
to report crimes is still a type of regulatory duty governed by administrative
agencies to achieve public good. In the case of mala in se, immoral acts cannot
be justified simply by the higher good they bring. Murder of an innocent person
to save the lives of several others cannot be justified except under highly limited
circumstances. However, non-reporting of crime is justified if the harm from
reporting exceeds the good. Thus, this analysis will estimate the moral culpability
of failing to report crime by weighing the pros and cons stemming from reporting
or failing to report.
With respect to corresponding penalties for non-reporting, the argument
in this paper develops based on the idea that only immoral behaviors above a
certain threshold require intervention by the state via criminal sanctions, while

47 Some legal theorists are unable to justify “Bad Samaritan” laws, which impose liability on one
who fails to aid, due to the lack of causation. See Eric Mack, Bad Samaritanism and the Causation
of Harm, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 230 (1980); Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 151 (1973). However, even in those articles, for instance, Eric Mack limited his research to
statues “which require action of individuals who have entered into some special relations with an
endangered party or who have a special ability to avert the threatening harm”; Mack, supra, at 230.
Thus, even these legal theorists might not argue against imposing criminal liability on the failure to
report crime, which is a crime of omission like failure-to-aid, and limited to specific professions or
industries as the laws in this analysis.
48 John Harris, The Marxist Conception of Violence, 3 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 192, 192 (1974).
49 H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 48 (2d ed. 1985).
50 See Joshua Dressler, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About "Bad Samaritan" Laws, 40
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971, 980-81 (2000).
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immoral behaviors under the threshold should be regulated by administrative or
civil sanctions. Unlike its European counterparts, the U.S. has not recognized the
principle of proportionality, by which harms and goods are balanced.51 However,
the U.S. does require some balancing—namely, cost-benefit analysis—in
enacting a regulation. 52 In the same vein, Husak argued for alternatives to
criminal sanctions as a means of controlling mala prohibita.53
2. Enforcement or Enactment of Laws on “Duty to Report” Crimes
The purpose of the law is to cause people to act in a certain manner.
Creating a duty to report framework reflecting society’s moral code has a more
measurable effect on compliance than day-to-day enforcement.
Prosecutors tend to enforce the duty-to-report laws discussed above, but
enforcement of each category of duty-to-report laws varies. The duty-to-report
law involving the release of substances from a vessel under 42 U.S.C. § 9603,
has been enforced in many cases. 54 Also, the law requiring the reporting of
suspicious activity by financial institutions, under 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (g), has been
enforced against individuals and financial institutions in many cases.55 However,
enforcement of the following laws has not been as consistent: the duty to report
child pornography by electronic communication service providers and remote
computing service providers, under 18 U.S.C. § 2258A; the duty to report cyber
incidents by Department of Defense contractors, under 10 U.S.C. § 391 and 32
51

JUD MATHEWS, RESEARCH PAPER, SEARCHING FOR PROPORTIONALITY IN U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, PENN STATE LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 1-2015 1, 1-2 (2015).
52SeeMAEVE P. CAREY, COST-BENEFIT AND OTHER ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS IN THE RULE MAKING
PROCESS, Cong. Research Serv. (2014).
53 Husak, supra note 30, at119.
54 United States v. Freter, 31 F.3d 783, 784 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961,
962 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1550 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1448 (11th Cir. 1988).
55 Historically, though, most enforcement has been through Deferred Prosecution Agreements. See
Press Release, U.S. Att’y Office E.D. Pa.,Bank President Charged With Failure To Comply With
Requirements Of The Bank Secrecy Act,DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 11, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/bank-president-charged-failure-comply-requirements-banksecrecy-act; Press Release, U.S. Att’y Office S.D. N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney And FBI
Assistant Director-In-Charge Announce Filing Of Criminal Charges Against And Deferred
Prosecution Agreement With JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., In Connection With Bernard L.
Madoff’s Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme, DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-and-fbi-assistant-director-chargeannounce-filing-criminal; Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Commerzbank AG Admits to
Sanctions and Bank Secrecy Violations, Agrees to Forfeit $563 Million and Pay $79 Million Fine,
DEP’T OF JUST. (March 12, 2015) http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/commerzbank-ag-admitssanctions-and-bank-secrecy-violations-agrees-forfeit-563-million-and; Riggs Bank Enters Guilty
Plea and Will Pay $16 Million Fine for Criminal Failure to Report Numerous Suspicious
OF
JUST.(Jan.
27,
2005),
Transactions,
DEP’T
http://www.justice.gov/archive/tax/usaopress/2005/txdv050530.html; Ripple Labs Inc. Resolves
Criminal Investigation, DEP’T OF JUST. (May 5, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ripple-labsinc-resolves-criminal-investigation.
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C.F.R. part 236; and the duty to report data breaches under the Identity Theft
Protection Act of North Carolina. What are the implications of this variance in
government’s enforcement of such laws?
To begin, the sheer number of enforcement cases does not reveal much
about the lack of enforcement. Reasons other than failure by investigators and
prosecutors exist for the low numbers of enforcement cases. If there is a high rate
of compliance with the law in question, there would be no need for enforcement
actions. Indeed, the law itself may lead to high rates of compliance. For instance,
compared to the duty to report suspicious activities imposed on financial
institutions who have an additional duty to investigate, the duty to report child
pornography does not include an obligation to proactively investigate, which will
lower the rate of detection, thereby decreasing the possibility of non-reporting.
Accordingly, a perception of the enforcement rate would be more meaningful,
but is difficult to ascertain without an accurate estimate of the total number of
crimes committed. This is particularly true when one views the crime of failureto-report as victimless.
In addition, lack of enforcement matters when it further decreases
compliance with the law.56 Even if the ratio of total enforcement to total noncompliance was available and correct, for it to influence the perception of
potential reporters, one must assume the unrealistic scenario of perfect
information. 57 More fundamentally, day-to-day enforcement does not affect
compliance as strongly as a mandatory duty to report crime would.
One of the primary purposes of the law is to lead people to act in a
certain manner, and it accomplishes this goal in different ways. As Kenworthey
Bliz pointed out, “Laws express, manipulate, and enforce moral codes. Or Laws
can also be described as motivated by less moral-sounding commitments (such as
to maximize efficiency, allocate costs and benefits, avoid moral hazards and the
like).”58
The importance of enforcement59 differs depending on the way the law
affects behavior.60 For instance, to be an effective law,61 a prohibition on murder,

56

SeeINT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, CREDIBLE DETERRENCE IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITIES
REGULATION, 6 (2015), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD490.pdf (“Deterrence
is credible when would-be wrongdoers perceive that the risks of engaging in misconduct outweigh
the rewards and when non-compliant attitudes and behaviors are discouraged.”).
57 As in economics or game theory, “perfect information” here refers to the situation where a
person is assumed to have all relevant information with which to make a decision.
58 Kenworthey Bilz& Janice Nadler, Law, Psychology, and Morality, 50 PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING
AND MOTIVATION 102 (D. Medin, L. Skitka, C. W. Bauman, & D. Bartels, eds., Academic Press,
2009).
59 Whether enforcement of the law is necessary to make law “Law” is an issue that has sparked
much controversy. Joshua Kleinfeld suggests taking a “more or less approach” instead of a “yes or
no” approach in answering this question, and I adopt the same approach but for different reasons as
illustrated in the text. See Joshua Kleinfeld, Enforcement and the Concept of Law, YALE L.J.
ONLINE (Nov. 22 2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/enforcement-and-the-concept-oflaw.
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which enforces a widely accepted moral code, does not require as much
enforcement as a prohibition on smoking marijuana, which, depending on the
individual, manipulates or expresses certain moral codes. 62 Murder is not a
morally disputed act, unlike smoking marijuana, and people will generally refrain
from committing murder even without enforcement. By contrast, nonenforcement of prohibitions on smoking marijuana is likely to encourage
consumption by people who regard smoking marijuana as morally acceptable. If
law manipulates the moral codes by contradicting general moral norms,
enforcement must be stronger. In situations where a law contradicts general
moral norms, enforcement is often absent.63
Understanding the moral code surrounding the duty to report crime and
enacting corresponding laws is crucial, while enforcement of the laws is less
important. Whereas the moral code regarding consumption of marijuana is
divided, society will generally agree that crime is morally harmful. Further when
reporting crime is morally beneficial and failing to report crime becomes a moral
harm, the crime should be reported. 64 Duty-to-report laws do not manipulate
society’s moral code; they codify it. Enacting duty-to-report laws as a method of
manipulating existing moral code, will eventually increase enforcement cost.
Accordingly, this paper will focus its analysis on what the moral law ought to be.
IV. MORAL PRINCIPLES OF THE “DUTY TO REPORT” CRIMES
A. Theoretical Assumption for the Moral Culpability Test
This paper focuses on the normativity of law rather than the validity of
law, both of which are prevalent in current studies on the nature of law.65 Prior to
60 Hart, denying the enforcement-centric theory, emphasized the “internal point of view” which has
the “practical attitude of rule-acceptance” as an essential feature of law. Scott J. Shapiro, What is
the Internal Point of View?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157 (2006); see alsoH.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW (2nd ed. 1994).
61 Laws in conflict with social norm have been proven ineffective in many cases. See Daron
Acemogluy & Matthew O. Jackson, Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws 1 (NBER,
Working Paper No. 20369, 2014). Additionally, one could argue that law is most effective when it
reflects the moral code. Do this by showing how changing a behavior’s underlying morality is the
most efficient method of regulating conduct. See Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Moral
Attitudes, and Behavioral Change, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECON. AND THE
LAW (EyalZamir & Doron Teichman Eds., 2014).
62 PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 206 (2013).
63 Daron Acemogluy & Matthew O. Jackson, Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws 1
(Stanford Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 466, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2443427.
64 This paper assumes the “crime” to be reported is morally non-disputed, because a non-reporting
of morally disputed crime such as abortion would not be regarded as a moral wrong for some
people. This assumption is justified by including the good produced by reporting as a factor for the
culpability test. A person witnessing a morally disputed act may not regard the act as a moral
wrong, thus he would not expect any good produced by reporting which is essential in justifying
duty-to-report crimes laws.
65 See The Nature of Law, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Aug. 7, 2015,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-nature/.
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looking at the normativity of law in the context of the duty to report crime, it is
necessary to adopt a position in relation to the validity of law.
Whether citizens have a general duty to obey the law has been discussed
extensively in the context of the validity of law. The argument remains split. One
side argues for a general duty to obey the law;66 the other side denies a general
duty to obey and requires each specific law to be justified by its content in order
to be valid. 67 This paper will not take an explicit position on this argument.
However, I employ the position that unjust law is unjust, as it is helpful when
strictly scrutinizing the content of laws and regulations.68 The normative question
of what the law must be in order to be just will be considered before comparing it
to what the law is and suggesting modifications.
In the same vein, this study attempts to justify rather than explain, by
focusing on the moral legitimacy of law.69
This paper uses culpability factors, based on various sociological
behavioral studies, to analyze the culpability of certain behavior. These factors
consist of circumstantial variables which make some instances of reporting crime
morally desirable, 70 and vice versa. Knowing those variables will help us
recognize what the law ought to be and suggest modifications to current law to
adjust the outcome of variables as a way of increasing the moral desirability of
the act of reporting crime.
The principles drawn from the culpability factor analysis, in enacting or
reviewing laws criminalizing non-compliance with the duty to report crime,
should work as a baseline to help determine where deviations are justified.

66 See Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation to Obey, 18 GA. L. REV. 891, 891 (1984); See
also Walker, Political Obligation and the Argument from Gratitude, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 191, 196
(1988).
67 See M. B. E. Smith, Is There a Prima Face Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L. J. 950, 975
(1973); A. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLE AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION (1979).
68 This paper, in this way, does not fall into either of the two different directions pointed out by
Bentham that the confusion between law and morals had spread: "This ought not to be the law,
therefore it is not and I am free not merely to censure but to disregard it."; "This is the law,
therefore it is what it ought to be," and thus stifles criticism at its birth. H. L. A. Hart, Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 597-98 (1958) (citation omitted).
69 The Nature of Law, supra note 64.
70 In determining morally desirable behavior, the moderate, not absolute, deontologist view of this
paper suggests that constraints against harming others or breaching promise, etc., will be
overridden when the overall good achieved surpasses certain threshold. See JUDITH JARVIS
THOMSON, SOME RUMINATIONS ON RIGHTS, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK 49, 51-52 (William
Parent ed., 1986). The moderate deontologist view is more appropriate than the absolute
deontologist view for this study in that this paper provides the common moral sense of the public
and refers to the sociological researches to find factors affecting people’s behavior. See Eyal
Zamir& Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral Constraints with
L.
REV.
323,
326
(2008),
Economic
Analysis
of
Law,
96
CAL.
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol96/iss2/1 (“This moderate deontology
conforms to prevailing moral intuitions.”); CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1, 9 (Samuel
Scheffler ed., 1988) ("Indeed, most would agree that [deontological constraints and options] mirror
everyday moral thought much more closely than consequentialism does.").
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Deviations are not inherently wrong. Rather, they can be justified by different
circumstantial factors. However, recognition of this moral baseline is crucial to
understand which deviations can be justified.71
Lastly, for purposes of analyzing the culpability of not reporting crime in
this normative study of what the law ought to be, this paper assumes natural
status without human-made laws imposing a duty to report crimes. This
assumption is important, and draws from the controversial argument that there is
no moral obligation to obey immoral law.72 By doing so, the culpability analysis
here does not need to take into account the immorality of non-reporting when it
disobeys immoral, man-made duty-to-report laws. In addition, assuming natural
status enables general application of the norms derived from this study while
preventing the culpability result from being distorted by the morality of a society
previously influenced by man-made immoral laws at a particular time and
place.73
B. Culpability Factors Involved in the “Duty to Report” Crimes
It is difficult to deny the idea that there is a moral duty to report crime
that causes harm to others when the cost of doing so is minimal.74 Many legal
theorist and practitioners have advocated for a moral duty to aid endangered
persons. Doing so is a moral good, and failure to aid is a moral bad. J. H. Scheid
asserted that “the Law should . . . formally acknowledge the contemporary moral
consensus that we are all necessarily inter-dependent and that each member of

71

Recognition of the moral baseline and justifiable deviations will provide “a better account of how
much incommensurability is consistent with a defensible moral theory, and of where we should and
should not, expect to find such incommensurability” and prevents “drafters of criminal codes
[from] excusing any hodgepodge of rules and doctrines as reflecting inevitable
incommensurability.” KENNETH SIMONS, TOPOGRAPHY OF MORAL AND CRIMINAL LAW NORMS,
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 228, 241-242 (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds.,
2011).
72 By dividing a political or legal duty from a moral duty, some legal theorists and philosophers
have denied a moral obligation to obey unjust immoral laws. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA, I-II, Q.96, A.4 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, trans., Benzinger
Brothers,
1947),
https://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa/FS/FS096.html#FSQ96A6THEP1
(“[Unjust laws] do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or
disturbance”); MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM JAIL, WHY WE CAN’T WAIT
77, 84 (1963) (“One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely,
one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws.").
73 Law influences and reflects a society’s morals. The more prevalent view concerning the
relationship between law and morality is that of H.L.A. Hart, who asserted that law is a reflection
of morality. SeeH.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 199-200 (1961). But even Hart accepted the
possibility that law could influence morality in the first instance, as well as reflect it. SeeH.L.A.
HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 1-2 (1966). Thus, there is a risk of human-made immoral
laws distorting the morality of a society in natural status.
74 See Arthur Ripstein, The Moral and Legal Limits of Samaritan Duties, 19 L. & PHIL. 6 751, 752
(2000).
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society has a duty to aid his brother in danger.”75 Stephen Johnson Field, who
would go on to become a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, acknowledged “the moral
duty of every person to extend to others assistance when in danger.”76 Reporting
crime, as one of many ways to help a victim, while not identical, is similar to
aiding the victim of a crime. Thus, this paper recognizes a moral duty to report
crimes.
The immorality of each failure to report should be treated differently in
the same manner that failure to report crime should be treated differently from
failure to aid.77 Helping the victim imposes a higher burden on an individual as
opposed to simply reporting. Accordingly, not helping is less immoral than not
reporting. The failure to report crime when it negatively impacts the reporter is
less immoral than not reporting crime when it does not carry such risk.
This paper is designed to identify situations where the cost of compliance
would be low enough to justify criminalizing the failure to report crime. As
analyzed in the later part of this paper, omission liability is problematic as it
restrains individual’s freedom in an intrusive way. Thus, it should be justified
only when the cost of reporting is low enough, or, in other words, when
immorality of omission is high enough.
In identifying such circumstantial factors, which I call culpability factors,
this paper bases its analysis on behavioral science’s study of individual responses
to another experiencing an “emergency.”78
The main experiment referenced in this paper demonstrates the factors
affecting the witness’s behavior:
When an emergency is unambiguous, involving severe negative
consequences to another person with minimal negative consequences for the
person (s) who help(s), and when the amount of effort required for intervention is
minimal, derogation of the victim is not an appropriate response, and diffusion of
responsibility is not likely to occur, individuals will intervene in an emergency
situation. Even if a situation is perceived as serious and requiring intervention,
any of the three latter conditions may prevent intervention.79
The experiment mentioned above illustrates the culpability factors that
must be considered when enacting laws on the duty to report crime. 80 This
75

Scheid, supra note 39.
U. S. v. Knowles, 26 F.Cas. 800, 801 (N.D. Cal. 1864).
77 See Ripstein, supra note 73, at 753 n.2 (2000) (“The most compelling way of explaining the
difference can be put in terms of Kant's distinction between "perfect" and "imperfect" duties. Easy
rescues are plausibly catalogued as requirements - ‘perfect duties’ to use Kant's phrase - which take
priority over each person's pursuit of his or her own projects. Other moral demands of aid are
‘imperfect duties’, ones that we should fulfill somehow or other, but which do not take automatic
priority over each person's pursuit of his or her own projects.”).
78 As reporting crime is a type of aid provided to an endangered victim, the decision of whether to
report a crime proceeds through the same morality analysis as deciding whether to help a victim.
79 Russell D Clark & Larry E. Word, Why Don't Bystanders Help? Because of Ambiguity?, 24 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 392, 399 (1972).
80 The experiment on implementing a duty to rescue does not consider a possible benefit derived
from an existing special relationship between a rescuer and a victim. If the rescuer is in a position
76
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chapter works from the above experiment to select several culpability factors that
affect the level of morality of reporting crimes or immorality of non-reporting.
The first factor is knowledge of the crime. The experiment above shows
that bystanders tend not to aid the victim when the emergency situation is
ambiguous.81 The same dynamic applies with respect to reporting crime. People
are unlikely to report crime when they lack sufficient information to determine
whether the scene they witnessed was a crime required to be reported or not. The
morality of reporting differs depending on the knowledge of the potential
reporter (e.g., knowing, suspecting, or not knowing). The non-reporting person
with clear knowledge of the crime is more blameworthy, and more immoral, than
the non-reporting person with insufficient information. After all, this person had
to measure the risk-impact of erroneous reporting.82 In addition, a person who did
not know of the crime cannot be blamed for non-reporting. This knowledge
factor is particularly important in relation to the criminalization of noncompliance, when viewing the issue through the lens of criminal law and the
assignment of culpability.
The second factor is the absence of alternative ways to expose the
apparent crime being witnessed. There are two different situations: the first is
when special skills are necessary to aid; the other is when they are not. Regarding
the first situation, according to one experiment, individuals with specialized skills
are more willing to assist a victim.83 Various methods, each requiring a unique
skill set, exist to aid a victim depending on the crime in question. Thus, a person
with the necessary skills to aid who decides not to is more immoral than a person
who does not possess the necessary skills. The second person’s lack of
competence justifies his failure to aid. Reporting, though, is a specific type of
“aid” that, unlike conventional aiding, cannot be diversified, nor does it require a
different set of competencies; reporting itself does not require any special skill.
In contrast to the special skills that may be needed to aid, the duty to report crime
will never be unsatisfied due to a lack of ability. Concerning the second situation,
where it is possible to take advantage of a victim, the rescuer might take into account the possible
benefit to himself in deciding whether to aid the victim or not. For instance, the victim could be the
rescuer’s competitor for a monetary or honor prize. The same is true for a duty to report crimes.
The special relationship between a reporter and a primary offender could provide a reporter an
opportunity to take advantage of the crime by not reporting the crime. However, as constraints
against doing harm do not apply to aggressors, this benefit gained by the immoral act of not aiding
or not reporting should not be counted as a factor in this culpability test. SeeSHELLY KAGAN,
NORMATIVE ETHICS 92-93 (1998) (listing the normative morality factors as good, harm, and consent
etc., affecting the rightness or wrongfulness of the act).
81 Clark & Word, supra note 78.
82 Level of certainty affects the possibility of achieving good and causing harm differentiating the
resulting morality level of reporting. This relationship between knowledge about the crime and
immorality of non-reporting can be illustrated by the following formula: [p(Correct)x(Good) - p(1correct)x(Harm)]. If the result is positive, then the act of reporting is moral. If the result is negative,
then non-reporting is moral. Although exact quantification is not possible in this paper, this formula
shows why the possibility of erroneous reporting matters.
83 A. E. Kazdin, & J. H. Bryan, Competence and Volunteering, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 87 (1971).
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another study illustrated that people tend to help others in emergency situations
when they are alone more than when they are in a group.84 In a group setting, the
diffusion of responsibility causes people to wait for someone else to make the
first move, thereby preventing anyone from taking action.85 Indeed, the absence
of possible alternative reporters, particularly in victimless crimes or crimes
against helpless victims, renders the failure to report more immoral.
The third factor to consider is the good produced by reporting. Based on
crime reporting, state authorities detect the crime reported and deter the offender
from materializing on-going or future harm through retribution or
rehabilitation.86 In addition, using the reported information shared through state
authorities, other private entities could detect and deter covert on-going or
possible future crimes. All of these will lead to higher detection rates, resulting in
general deterrence of crime. The overall quantity of good produced depends on
the characteristics of crime: its type, magnitude, extensiveness, and continuity or
repeatability of harm. As rightly pointed out by the experiment above, people
tend to aid one another when they witness “severe negative consequences to
another person”87 in order to mitigate the harm or, in other words, achieve good.
If an individual does not aid a victim at risk of death, his or her non-aiding is
more immoral than non-aid of a victim at risk of minor injury. In the same vein,
not reporting serious crimes is more immoral than the non-reporting of minor
crimes. For example, a murder witness is more morally required to report the
murder than a battery witness is to report the battery. Another study explains that
people generally accept more serious punishment for not reporting serious
crimes, as opposed to minor offences.88
The fourth factor is the harm caused to the reporter by reporting the
crime. People are more likely aid victims when the “negative consequences for
the person (s) who help(s),” and “the amount of effort required for intervention is
minimal.” 89 Similarly, people are more likely to provide information about
crimes to national authorities when the cost of reporting is low. A person is not
expected to report his own wrongs, to carry out costly investigations to uncover

84

Clark & Word, supra note 78, at 392-93 (“Several studies have demonstrated that individuals
faced with an emergency situation are more likely to render aid when alone than when in the
presence of others . . . . [T]he bulk of research overwhelmingly casts doubt on the suggestion that in
most situations the individual is more likely to receive help if more people are present during an
emergency.” (citations omitted)).
85 Id. at 393 (“Latane and Darley (1970a) . . . have identified social influence and diffusion of
responsibility as two determinants of bystander intervention.” (citation omitted)).
86 From the perspective of the moral culpability of a private individual who has to decide his
behavior in a specific situation, the good produced here does not include the general deterrent effect
but only the specific deterrent effect of crime reporting. The harm mitigated by general deterrence
is too distant from the act of reporting to qualify as the harm caused by non-reporting. See
discussion, supra Chapter III. 2. (a) of this paper.
87 Clark & Word, supra note 78, at 399.
88 L. Veneziano and C. Veneziano, Should there be a duty to report crimes?, 87PSYCHOL REP. 423
(2000).
89 Clark & Word, supra note 78, at 399.
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another’s crime, or to report crimes which will cause serious reputational or
monetary damage to himself. Accordingly, not reporting a crime that would
cause serious harm to the reporter is less immoral than not reporting a crime that
only incurs minor harm to the reporter.
The final factor is the harm caused by reporting to the individual being
reported. Constraints against doing harm do not apply to aggressors,90 so for this
test, harm to a primary offender, such as criminal punishment caused by
reporting, will generally not be regarded as harm except for the harm to the
primary offender’s confidentiality right. As the confidentiality right is derived
from the relationship between the individual being reported and the reporter,91
the status of the individual being reported as a primary offender does not
automatically encroach on the protected right. 92 In addition, the erroneous
reporting of an individual as a primary offender will cause serious harm to that
individual. 93 The harms to the reported individual negatively affect the
immorality of non-reporting. Although these harms are categorized as harm to
the individual being reported, some of the harms can also be indirectly regarded
as harms to the reporter. The individual being reported can transfer the cost of
harm through law suits against the reporter for breach of confidentiality or
erroneous reporting. This, in turn, will decrease the likelihood of future reporting
and the immorality of non-reporting.
C. The Position of a Reporter as the Standard for Categorizing Duties
In this essay I suggest that the position of a reporter, be it an offender, a
third-party, or a victim, vis-a-vis the crime being reported is the most appropriate
criterion for determining whether a duty to report a crime exists. The criterion—
the position of a reporter—illustrates a significant discrepancy in the results of
the culpability test between duties in different categories while showing a
tendency toward similar results between duties in the same category.
In considering individuals’ knowledge about a particular crime,
offenders and victims have clear knowledge about the crime in question, while
third parties are necessarily less certain. This does not mean that an offender
knows every single crime committed by a primary offender nor that a victim
knows all crimes committed against him. A person with superior responsibility
might fail to recognize the crime committed by its employee bribing foreign
officials to increase sales, as the employee will try to hide his wrongdoings by

90

Kagan, supra note 79, at 92-93.
Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L. J. 123, 135-38 (2007).
92 The confidentiality right is to be preserved even for criminal suspects except under certain
circumstances. The sole status of the individual being reported as a Primary Offender does not
satisfy such exceptions. See, i.e. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.6. (2013).
93 Erroneous reporting is closely related with the first factor of knowledge about the crime.
Seesupranote 81.
91
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breaching the internal compliance regulations of his employer. A victim could
fail to recognize data breaches or cyber incidents, as hackers tend to hide their
attacks on victim’s system to maximize harm.94 However, when they discover a
lead on the crime committed, both offender and victim are able to investigate
further and discover the crime as they both have access to the necessary
information. In contrast, a third party, as an outsider in relation to crime, has
limited access to information necessary to analyze what really happened. Thus,
when other factors are controlled, non-reporting by offenders and victims is
likely to be regarded as more immoral than non-reporting by third parties.
The harm to a reporter caused by reporting also varies greatly based on
the position of the reporter. In the case of an offender, the harm caused by
reporting is not restricted to possible civil suits brought by their victim, but also
criminal penalties for the crime committed. The possible criminal repercussions
are vast, ranging from social stigma to legal restrictions beyond punishment
prescribed by the criminal law.95 For a third party, the primary “harm” is the cost
of gathering and analyzing information to determine whether crime is actually
occurring. 96 Though a victim will generally report the crime voluntarily for
remuneration and revenge, some specific victims tend not to report due to the
possibility of additional harm caused by the reporting itself. For instance, rape
victims may prefer to not report the rape to avoid the criminal process and its toll
on victims. Institutions or corporations sometimes do not report crimes
committed against them for various reasons: potential reputational harm; 97 the

94

New Ponemon Institute Survey Reveals Time to Identify Advanced Threats is 98 Days for
Financial Services Firms, 197 Days for Retail, ARBOR NETWORKS (May 19, 2015),
https://www.arbornetworks.com/new-ponemon-institute-survey-reveals-time-to-identify-advancedthreats-is-98-days-for-financial-services-firms-197-days-for-retail.
95SeeCollateral Damage: America’s Failure to Forgive or Forget in the War on Crime, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION
OF
CRIMINAL
DEFENSE
LAWYERS
(2014),
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/Collateral%20Damage%20FINAL%20Report.pdf
(“The collateral consequences of conviction . . . have become more severe, more public and more
permanent. These consequences affect virtually every aspect of human endeavor, including
employment and licensing, housing, education, public benefits, credit and loans, immigration
status, parental rights, interstate travel, and even volunteer opportunities.”). For an entity criminal
defendant, damage to its reputation works as an effective sanction by itself. See Jonathan M.
Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal
Fraud, 36 J. LAW & ECON. 757 (1993).
96 Pecuniary harm of losing its future profits from services provided to criminals could also be
considered as harm to a reporter resulting from his reporting. As was pointed out by Kraakman, an
offender might be able to easily find an alternative service provider to continue its criminal activity.
See Kraakman, supra note 4, at 63 (“wrongdoers can easily search for pliable gatekeepers on the
market.”). However, from the deontologist perspective of this paper, this loss of future profit may
not be properly classified as harm to a reporter because constraints against doing harm do not apply
to immoral acts like assisting offenders.
97
SeeThe
Value
of
Reputation,
THOMSON
REUTER
(April
2012),
https://risk.thomsonreuters.com/sites/default/files/GRC03270.pdf (“Investors and other providers of
capital may increase the risk premium in the cost of capital they extend or choose not to do
business altogether.”); see alsoJohn E. Black Jr., Awake at Night: Cyber breaches and the New Risk
to Directors and Officers, IRMI (Oct. 2014), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-
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risk of administrative penalties for failing to comply with administrative
regulations, especially when such regulations are designed to prevent those
companies from being victimized in the first place; 98 the risk of class action
lawsuits by the original victim against secondary victim institutions; 99 and the
risk of derivative suits from shareholders for mismanagement. 100 Unlike an
offender or victim reporter, a third party may also suffer from indirect harm
caused by erroneous reporting or breach of confidentiality. However, this harm
will be measured as the harm caused by the reporting to the individual being
reported.
The harm to the individual being reported caused by reporting, as
discussed in the prior section, is the breach of the right of confidentiality and the
risk of erroneous reporting. The right of confidentiality is derived from the
relationship between the reporter and the individual being reported. This
confidential relationship exists only with the third party reporter (not the offender
or the victim)—such as a doctor, lawyer, or financial institution— to whom the
individual being reported entrusted his interest. Therefore, all other things being
equal, the immorality of non-reporting by some third parties is lower than that of
an offender or a victim. In addition, harm caused by erroneous reporting is likely
to be higher when the report comes from a third party, due to the third party’s
lack of first-hand knowledge about the crime compared to the offender or victim.
This further lessens the immorality of non-reporting by a third party.
In contrast, there are several culpability factors where the position of the
reporter does not make a significant difference in determining the level of
culpability.
The existence of alternatives to expose the crime in question is not
generally affected by the position of the reporter, but by the crime itself. For
instance, certain victimless crimes,101 such as certain drug crimes, where there is
no apparent harm to any identifiable individual, are hardly detected. This makes
commentary/awake-at-night-cyberbreaches-and-the-new-risk-to-directors-and-officers.
(“Poor
security can present other risks for a company, potentially . . . tarnishing its reputation, and
undermining its relationship with customers. Lost business and damage to reputation can be
significant: US companies estimated losing $3.3 million in business on average due to data
breaches in 2013.”).
98See Black Jr., supra note 96. (“[F]ederal and state regulatory agencies . . . are very active in
investigating data breaches of personal information.”).
99Id. (“Large breaches typically are followed by class action lawsuits on behalf of persons whose
personal information was compromised. Although such lawsuits have often struggled to survive
dismissal . . ., class action data breach suits are expensive to defend.”).
100Id. (“[A]s the risk of a serious and damaging cyberattack grows, so too does the risk of a lawsuit
against directors and officers.”).
101 Whether victimless crimes should be criminalized or not is another legal philosophy involving
concept of harm. Accordingly, the definition and scope of the victimless crime have also been the
focus of heated debate. Instead of entering into this debate, this paper adopts, for the sake of the
second factor - existence of alternative to expose crime - the definition that a victimless crime is
any illegal action that is voluntarily consented between two parties and lacks crime victims or a
complaining participant. See generallyEDWIN M. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS: DEVIANT
BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY 169 (1965); CONKLIN, CRIMINOLOGY 21 (2001).
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the immorality of non-reporting by a person who knows about the crime greater
than in non-victimless scenarios. Crimes against helpless victims, such as
children or elders, are less likely to be discovered without someone other than the
victims reporting them. And, when other factors are controlled, this renders the
non-reporting of crime against a helpless victim more immoral than crime against
a non-helpless victim.
Furthermore, the good achievable by reporting varies by the crime being
reported. The good depends not on the legal categorization of the crime, but on
the particulars of each crime—such as its type, magnitude, extensiveness, and
continuity or repeatability of harm—that cannot be fully reflected in the law.
Several studies show that people generally believe crimes causing physical harm
are more serious than crimes causing property harm.102 However, they base their
analysis on legal classifications of crime, which cannot reflect the extraordinary
variance between particular crimes that are not reflected in their legal
classification. 103 These diverse factors can result in significant differences in
individual perception of the severity of the crime in question. It is clear that
murder is more serious than the embezzlement of 100 dollars, but it is less clear
whether the same murder should be considered more serious than a 1 trillion
dollar embezzlement scheme that caused many people to commit suicide.
This paper considers the position of a reporter in relation to the crime as
a criterion for categorizing duties to report crimes. As explained above, the
nature of the crime affects two morality factors while the position of the reporter
affects three. However, I consider the position of a reporter as a criterion for
categorizing not just because three is higher than two, but rather because unlike
the three types of reporters (offenders, third parties, or victims), categories of
crimes are too diverse to provide any meaningful principle or shared standard
that applies to the category as a whole. Furthermore, the position of a reporter
makes the laws and regulations adopted under the same category more
commensurable than the legal classification of the crime, as it is impossible for
legal classifications of crimes to properly distinguish between the acts within the
same classification.
The following sections provide guidance to help determine whether one
has a duty to report crime. These principles will be useful to policymakers when
creating laws that criminalize the failure to report crime.

102 MARVIN

E. WOLFGANG, ROBERT M. FIGLIO, PAUL E. TRACY, & SIMON I. SINGER, U.S. DEPT’ OF
JUSTICE, NCJ-96017, THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY, at vi (June 1985),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nscs.pdf.
103Id.
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D. What the Law Ought to Be
1. Rewards for Voluntary Reporting or Penalties for Failing to
Report
Before considering how these culpability factors apply to the various
duties to report crime, we must address the question of whether reporting should
be incentivized.
As Polinsky and Shavell caution, voluntary reporting carries the risk of
wasting time and resources. In Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, they
identify reasons why public enforcement is preferable to incentivized voluntary,
private enforcement in supplying information and otherwise aiding in detecting
violators.104 Specifically, “if a reward is available to everyone, there might be
wasteful effort devoted to finding violators . . . .”105 While a mandatory duty to
report tends to be limited in scope to specific professions or industries, a reward
tends to not have such limitation. A reward could be available not only to those
who directly witnessed the crime or who are in a better position to control it, but
also to those who have nothing to do with it.
Even if rewards are restricted to certain categories of people, rewarding
the voluntary reporting of crime seems morally inappropriate.
In the case of reporting by whistleblowers, who can be categorized as
offenders themselves in certain contexts,106 rather than by third parties or victims,
under the Dodd-Frank Act or Qui Tam Act, offering a monetary reward is
morally unjustifiable as it eventually rewards wrongdoing.107
Regarding third parties in professions or industries that place them in a
better position to suspect and witness crime, justifying voluntary reporting may
be difficult as well. Third parties operating under a voluntary reporting regime
shift harm to their clients or users with respect to their confidentiality rights
merely for the monetary benefit obtainable from reporting rather than to avoid
penalties for non-compliance, which exist under a duty-based reporting regime.
In the case of a victim-reporter, unlike an offender or a third party
reporter, no moral objection to rewarding a victim for voluntarily reporting crime

104

A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 1 HANDBOOK
(2007).
105 Id. These wasteful efforts by private enforcement also lead to a serious problem of overreporting or false reporting of crime which will in turn trigger waste by public enforcement to
discern valuable reports from invaluable ones.
106 Compliance officers could be held liable for their company’s wrongdoings caused by their
negligence. However, by voluntarily reporting the wrongdoings, they are rewarded for their
negligence. SeeSEC Announces $300,000 Whistleblower Award to Audit and Compliance
Professional Who Reported Company's Wrongdoing, SEC (Aug. 29, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542799812#.VBjEr_ldWfh.
107See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Whistle-Blower Awards Lure Wrongdoers Looking to Score, NEW
YORK TIMES (Dec. 30, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/30/whistle-blower-awards-lurewrongdoers-looking-to-score/.
OF L. AND ECON. 1, 5
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exists. On the contrary, even under the mandatory reporting regime, 108 rewarding
a victim-reporter is appropriate given the understanding that a higher level of
immorality is required for the criminalization of non-reporting by a victim than
by other reporters.109
2. Application of the Culpability Test
The conclusions drawn by applying the culpability factor test allow for
an understanding of the immorality of non-reporting or, conversely, the morality
of reporting. The good caused, or harm mitigated, by reporting can be considered
a positive factor in that knowledge about the crime increases the immorality of
non-reporting. The existence of alternative methods to expose crime, the harm
caused by reporting to reporters, and the harm caused by reporting to the
individual being reported can be considered negative factors because their
presence decreases the immorality of non-reporting.
Once we define morally desired or blameworthy behavior, we must
determine whether such behavior should be encouraged or prohibited by law.
Assuming non-reporting of crime is morally wrong, must reporting be compelled
by law? Are law and morality directly parallel? Of course, there are moral acts
that are illegal and immoral acts that are legal. Should the non-reporting of crime
be legal even if immoral?
There are two types of immoral, legal acts. First, there are those acts
which are immoral, but which are nevertheless expressly permitted under the law
(e.g., slavery in colonial America). Second, there are those acts which are
immoral, but are not regulated by any law (e.g., adultery). The first type is clearly

108

For voluntary reporting, it is necessary to provide proper incentive to encourage reporting. In
relation to victim’s reporting of cyber security breaches, many commentators expose the lack of
proper incentive as one of many problems with current legislation that adopts a voluntary reporting
system. See Susan Cassidy & Perter Terenzio, Competing Bills Focus on Cybersecurity Information
Sharing But Final Language and Ultimate Passage Remain Unknown, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
(July 10, 2015), https://www.insidegovernmentcontracts.com/2015/07/competing-bills-focus-oncybersecurity-information-sharing-but-final-language-and-ultimate-passage-remain-unknown/. (“It
would appear from the current bills that there are many benefits associated with receiving
information about cyber threat indicators, and few benefits associated with providing that
information.”); see also N. Eric Weiss, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43821, Legislation to Facilitate
Cybersecurity
Information
Sharing:
Economic
Analysis
1,
1
(2015),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=763646 (“One obstacle to reducing cybercrime is misaligned
incentives, which reduce information sharing about cyber attacks.”).
109 More descriptive explanation will be provided later in this paper for why non-reporting by a
victim-reporter must be more immoral than for non victim-reporters before one can justify its
criminalization. This paper will also explore the relationship between providing incentives for
reporting acts for which non-reporting is more immoral. Based on the “heightened level of nonreporting immorality” requirement given to a victim-reporter, I accept that the standard measures to
gain crime information from a victim could be voluntary rather than mandatory, which I opposed in
the case of an offender-reporter. However, again, I need to emphasize that a standard is the baseline
where a discussion starts and a deviation from the standard can be justified in certain cases. Once it
is justified, it can, itself, develop into another standard.
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not desirable. Turning then to the second type, should the duty to report crimes
be understood in the same way as adultery? Even if we consider adultery
immoral, is it moral for a state to prohibit and punish this act? Similarly, even if
we consider failure to report crime immoral, is it moral for the state to prohibit
and punish this failure to act? For this question, we turn to the culpability test.
When application of the test demonstrates immorality of non-reporting above the
certain threshold, it should be regulated by the law.
Although I do not address the difficult, if not impossible, task of
quantifying the immorality threshold, the test still provides relational principles
applicable to our analysis. A higher degree of immorality of non-reporting or
morality of reporting brings a stronger need to regulate. The severity of the
penalty should be proportional to the level of immorality.
3. Highest Immorality Required for Criminalization of Noncompliance with Duty-To-Report Laws
In general, the severity of penalties should be proportional to the
seriousness of the required or prohibited behavior. Criminal punishment, as
opposed to civil or administrative sanctions, is the government’s strongest arm.
It should be the last resort, and used only to remedy the most serious instances of
wrongdoing.
Additionally, in order for criminalization to be justified, omission must
represent a higher level of immorality than would acts of commission.
As Leo Katz explains, regarding the deeper moral reason why acts of
omission offend society less than affirmative acts: “The person who fails to
prevent harm that would occur even if he didn't exist simply fails to give away
something he owns. The person who brings about harm that wouldn't occur if he
didn't exist takes away something owned by someone else.”110In the same vein,
Dressler illustrated that:
[A] law that requires a person to do Y (e.g., help a
bystander) bars that person from doing anything other than Y. . . .
[I]n a society that generally values personal autonomy, we need to
be exceptionally cautious about enacting laws that compel us to
benefit others, rather than passing laws that simply require us not to
harm others.111

Thus, the highest standard of immorality is required to criminalize the
failure to comply with one’s duty to report crime. After all, such failure is a
crime of omission: professionals with a duty to report can be found guilty of a

110LEO

KATZ, CRIMES OF OMISSION, FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 162-163 (Leo Katz et al. eds.,
1999).
111 Dressier, supra note 49, at 986-87.
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crime simply due to their failure to act as the “eyes and ears of the law
enforcement.”112
The following sections examine and suggest the principles of each type
of duty to report required to satisfy this highest level of immorality by increasing
the level of positive factors while decreasing the level of negative factors.
As Section Three explains, this paper uses the position of the reporter as
the criterion by which to categorize different types of duties to report crime.
Thus, among the five culpability factors, those three factors that vary based on
difference in position of the reporter will inform the analysis—namely, the
knowledge about crime, the potential harm to the reporter, and the harm caused
by reporting to the individual being reported.
The other two factors that vary based on the crime to be reported—the
existence of alternatives to expose crime and the good caused/harm mitigated
factors—will be considered when analyzing the duties to report crimes within the
same category. Thus, while the analysis of morality of the duties to report within
the same category will be similar for the three reporter-position factors, the
overall analysis could differ given the two crime-based factors. For instance,
criminalization of non-reporting by a third-party is generally difficult to justify
due to the third-party’s lack of first-hand knowledge. However, if the crime
witnessed by the third-party is serious, and there are no alternative ways to
expose the crime, criminalization of non-compliance with the duty to report may
be justified. The reverse is also true. Even if the three reporter-position factors
demonstrate the high immorality of non-reporting, criminalization might not be
justified when the crime in question is minor and causes little harm.
Non-reporting must rise to the highest level of immorality before one can
justify its criminalization. Thus, the relevant laws should be designed in a way
that foregoes criminalizing non-reporting unless it is egregiously immoral.
Legislators can use the three reporter-position factors – knowledge about the
crime, potential harm to the reporter, and potential harm to the individual being
reported – when designing these laws to ensure that sanctions apply only to
highly immoral failures to report. Otherwise, less immoral omissions based on
the three reporter-position factors should go unpunished, unless their otherwise
low immorality is raised to a level of high immorality by crime-based factors,
such as the existence of alternatives to expose crime and the good caused/harm
mitigated factors.

112

Thompson, supra note 6, at 36.
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4. Principles for Each Type of “Duty to Report”
a. “Duties to Report” Imposed on Offenders
“Offenders,” as used here, are those persons, including legal entities,
with possible strict vicarious criminal liability, not the people who actually
committed the crime. 113 I refer to the latter category as “primary offenders.”
Also, “offenders” does not include persons who have no liability in relation to the
crime committed in their organization or entity being regulated, as the duty to
report crime is only imposed on the people who can control and oversee the
behavior of primary offenders.
In the case of an offender-reporter, strict vicarious criminal and civil
liability has a serious negative effect on the overall culpability result. It makes
non-reporting less immoral and makes justifying the criminalization of nonreporting more difficult. Thus, to reach the highest level of immorality of nonreporting required to mandate reporting crime, the harm to the reporter would
need to be lessened via the opportunity for immunity or other mitigation.
However, immunity or other mitigation is not always available. Due
process principles protect an individual offender suspect from selfincrimination, 114 but do not apply to civil liabilities of individual or entityoffender. Furthermore immunity from civil liability cannot and should not be
allowed.
Immunity from civil liability affects both the harm to a reporter and the
good caused by reporting, but in the opposite direction with respect to justifying
the criminalization of non-reporting. While immunity decreases harm to a
reporter, the good caused by reporting will significantly decrease when an
individual or entity-offender reporter gets immunity from civil liability because
there is a little, if any, retributive effect; the victim does not receive enough
compensation. This is because primary offenders often lack the resources to
personally indemnify victims due to the sheer magnitude of harm that is possible
only in an organizational setting.115
113

Entities cannot commit crime, but their criminal liability for the crimes of their agents is widely
recognized. See, New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493, (1909) (“[T]he
liability is . . . imputed . . . because the act is done for the benefit of the principal, while the agent is
acting within the scope of his employment in the business of the principal, and justice requires that
the latter shall be held responsible for damages to the individual who has suffered by such
conduct.” (alteration in original)(citation omitted)). In addition, entities could be vicariously liable
even with strict internal compliance policies. See, United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 526 F. Supp.
2d 319, 326 (D. Conn. 2007) (“the existence of contrary company policies is not by itself a defense
to criminal liability; whether Ionia had an official position on the course of conduct undertaken by
its agents is merely one factor to be considered by the jury when assessing whether to impose
vicarious liability.”).
114U.S. CONST. amend. V.
115 See Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and
Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1349 (1982) (“the agent may not have
sufficient assets to cover the judgment, in which case his liability would be limited); see also
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Regarding criminal liability, Due Process guarantees that the law cannot
compel a person to put himself at risk of criminal penalty. This principle is in line
with the moral baseline I suggested - namely, that the law should compel
reporting only when an offender-reporter does not face the risk of criminal
penalties.
For instance, while 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603 (a) and (b) require “[a]ny person
in charge of a vessel or an offshore or an onshore facility shall, as soon as he has
knowledge of any release (other than a federally permitted release) of a
hazardous substance” to “immediately notify the National Response Center” and
penalizes non-compliance by a fine or imprisonment. The good achieved by
reporting —environmental protection— is proved to be great enough to
complement the possible harm to the offender reporter.
By contrast, the deviation under 31 U.S.C. § 5318 that offers financial
institutions and their employees no such protection of immunity when reporting
the crime committed by their insiders, even when the reporting could trigger their
vicarious criminal responsibility,116 may not be justified.
The law mandates financial institutions to report “any suspicious
transaction relevant to possible violation of law or regulation”117 and criminalizes
the willful violation of the duty-to-report regulation prescribed under 31 U.S.C. §
5318 by “[fine] not more than $250,000, or [imprisonment] for not more than
five years, or both.”118The corresponding regulation, 12 C.F.R. 21.11, adopted
under the authority of 31 U.S.C. § 5318, describes more specifically the duty to
report suspicious activities by categorizing the duty into four types.
The first type of reporting obligation, discussed herein, mandates
reporting:
[w]henever the national bank detects any known or suspected
Federal criminal violation, or pattern of criminal violations, . . .
involving a transaction or transactions conducted through the bank,
where the bank believes that . . . the bank was used to facilitate a
criminal transaction, and the bank has a substantial basis for identifying
one of its directors, officers, employees, agents or other institutionaffiliated parties as having committed or aided in the commission of a
criminal act, regardless of the amount involved in the violation. 119

Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate
Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 694 (1997) (“A principal reason is that culpable agents
frequently lack the assets to pay expected sanctions equal to the social costs of corporate
wrongdoing.”).
116 For a financial institution to be an offender-reporter, the crime committed by its insiders should
be the crime committed in their actual or apparent authority for the financial institution. See,
e.g.,New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909).
117 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (2017).
118 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (2017).
119 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(1) (2017).
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The regulation does not differentiate between suspicious activities with
possible criminal liability to the reporting financial institution from others and
does not guarantee that, in such case, the report will not be used against the
reporter in any criminal case.
This deviation from the suggested principle of criminal immunity to
offender-reporters could be justified if the good caused by reporting was greater.
The good caused by reporting varies according to the crime being reported, but
with respect to the duty to report suspicious activity, the event required to be
reported—suspicious activity—does not represent a specific crime, but a broad
set of federal criminal violations. Thus, to justify criminalization of noncompliance with the duty to report suspicious activity, certain serious crimes, the
detection or prevention of which would cause greater good by reporting, should
be specified.
The above analysis of current law equates the criminalization of noncompliance with a duty to report crime. That is, in addition to the strict vicarious
criminal liability for the underlying crime, the crime of failing to report carries
with it the threat of additional punishments. In practice, however, an alternative
exists whereby an offender reporter is rewarded for reporting by the mitigation of
the strict vicarious criminal liability associated with the underlying crime. The
following example illustrates this point.
DOJ issued the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 120 providing that
firms are entitled to leniency if: (i) the firm had an effective compliance program
and promptly reported any detected wrongdoing; (ii) the firm self-reported the
wrong; or (iii) the firm fully cooperated and accepted responsibility. 121
Furthermore, prosecutor’s offices have continued to refrain from indicting
cooperating firms through Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non
Prosecution Agreements.122 While criticizing the guidelines and advocating for
reform, leading scholars in corporate crime generally admit that the guidelines
are consistent with their recommendation for a composite liability regime.123

120

U.S.
ORGANIZATIONAL
SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
§
4
(2014),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2014/CHAPTER_4.pdf.
121
U.S.
ORGANIZATIONAL
SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
§
8C2.5(f)-(g)
(2014),
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2015-guidelines-manual/archive/2014-chapter-8.
122 As the Gibson Dunn Chart illustrates, use of NPAs and DPAs by DOJ has drastically increased
since 2003 culminating in 2015. See2015 Year-End Update on Corporate Non-Prosecution
Agreements (NPAs) and Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs), GIBSON DUNN, 23-35 (Jan.
2016),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2015-Year-End-Update-Corporate-NonProsecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements.aspx.
123See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 114, at 746, 751-752 (“The basic approach of the Sentencing
Guidelines - to mitigate fines for those firms that have an effective compliance program, cooperate
with the government's investigation, and/or report wrongdoing - is consistent with our
recommendations. The structure of the Sentencing Guidelines' composite regime, however, is not.
The amount of mitigation firms receive for monitoring, investigating, and reporting is not
necessarily sufficient to induce optimal policing . . . . To induce optimal policing, . . . the
Commission must…attempt to take into account the impact of policing measures on the probability
of detection.”).
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This leniency increases reporting of crime by an offender, and is
effective without the need to go through an arduous legislative process. However,
the economic benefits realized by the DOJ guidance do not guarantee its moral
justifiability.124From the morality perspective, leniency to an offender-reporter is
a deviation from the moral baseline. When considering the culpability factors in a
comprehensive examination of the duty-to-report regime, leniency to an
offender-reporter does not fit into the overall picture. This incentive to offenderreporters is not available to third parties or victims because neither has any
liability as a wrongdoer. It is difficult to morally reconcile the act of rewarding
an offender-reporter, who could have contributed to or benefitted from the
underlying crime, with the act of requiring third-parties or victims to report crime
merely to avoid sanctions.
Thus, in order to align the duty to report crime and the criminalization of
non-compliance with society’s moral perception while treating the interest of an
offender differently from the interest of a primary offender, offenders should
have a mandatory duty to report crimes, but receive immunity from criminal
liability for the underlying crime. However, offender-reporters should not
receive immunity from any resulting civil liability. An exemplary deviation from
this baseline 125 is the UK’s current S7 of the Bribery Act which creates the
offence of a company’s failure to prevent bribery by its associated persons and
the proposal to amend the law to expand the scope of the duty to prevent to
include other financial crimes.126
Recognizing this baseline is crucial for understanding how to justify
deviations. Deviations are not inherently wrongful, and they can be justified by
the diverse circumstantial factors and characteristics of the targeted crime which
can lead to differing results based on the existence of alternatives to expose crime
and good caused/harm mitigated factors. For instance, the deviation from
voluntary reporting backed by reward will be justified if the good caused by the
reporting is not high enough to satisfy the highest level of immorality necessary
to criminalize non-reporting.

124See

Zamir& Medina, supra note 69, at 325 (citing Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying CostBenefit Analysis, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1037, 1037 (2000)) (noting that the justifying foundations of
cost-benefit analysis are "at best suspect and at worst in ruins.").
125 A proposed amendment to S7 of the Bribery Act is to criminalize failing to prevent certain
criminal acts. This effectively creates a duty to prevent crime that is stronger than the duty to
report crime. Failure to prevent is less immoral than failure to report because preventing crime
brings more harm to the obligee than reporting crime. Thus, when other factors are controlled,
duty-to-prevent laws would generally be harder to justify than duty-to-report law.
126 SeeAttorney General’s keynote address to the 32nd Cambridge International Symposium on
Economic Crime on Tuesday 2 September 2014, GOV’T OF UK (Sept. 5 2014),
www.gov.uk/government/speeches/attorney-generals-keynote-address-to-the-32nd-cambridgeinternational-symposium-on-economic-crime-on-tuesday-2-september-2014 (last visited May 27,
2016); see alsoProposed changes to the UK Bribery Act, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, (May 2014),
http://www.financierworldwide.com/proposed-changes-to-the-uk-bribery-act/#.VseK-UITJUc (last
visited May 27, 2016).
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b. “Duties to Report” Crime Imposed on Third Parties
In relation to the knowledge about the crime factor, lack of certainty or
knowledge could have serious negative effects on the culpability test, resulting in
low levels of culpability for non-reporting and, thus, not satisfying the highest
level of culpability required for criminalization. Due to inherent vagueness or
line-drawing problems of underlying statutes and regulations, the moral
culpability of a non-reporter becomes clear only when quality evidence proves
clear and convincing criminality of the reported behavior. 127 The more
ambiguous the accident or crime, the less likely that a bystander will intervene or
even report the situation. 128 As observed in Pesce v. J. Sterling Morton High
School,129 “a reporter may in good faith determine that reporting is not morally
right, even if the flimsy evidence in his possession would be enough to trigger
mandatory reporting.”130
So, to meet the highest level of culpability necessary to criminalize nonreporting, a third party should know the criminality of the underlying act.
Anything less is not sufficiently culpable. For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 2258A
requires “actual knowledge of any facts or circumstances” involving the crime
for the duty to report child pornography imposed on “an electronic
communication service or a remote computing service” to be triggered and for
the non-compliance with such duty to be criminalized.131
From this knowledge perspective, a third party might be less morally
required to report crime than an offender or a victim, when other culpability
factors are controlled. Compared to an offender or a victim, a third party tends to
be in a position which does not provide certainty about the existence of the crime
to be reported, even though the duty to report crime is generally imposed on

127

In the case of duty to report crimes, one under obligation must decide whether the act witnessed
constituted a crime that is mandatory to report. Vagueness of such laws makes it difficult to decide
whether the act constitutes a crime or not. The lack of third-party knowledge of the acts increases
the difficulty. See George C. Christie, Vagueness and Legal Language, 48 MINN. L. REV. 885
(1964) (asserting that vagueness is an inescapable and indispensable tool, but not a deterrent, for
regulating human behavior); see also ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAW 163-165 (2014) (explaining the vagueness and line-drawing
problem in regard to the crime of omission).
128 See Clark & Word, supra note 80; see also Wenik, supra note 6, at 1790 (observing that
bystanders were less likely to help when ambiguity surrounded a worker’s accidental electrocution)
(citing Clark & Word, Where is the Apathetic Bystander? Situational Characteristics of the
Emergency, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 279 (1974); Shotland & Stebbins, Bystander
Response to Rape: Can a Victim Attract Help?, 10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 521-22 (1980)
(bystanders reluctant act after hearing simulated rape because of their uncertainty about what was
happening)).
129 Pesce v. J. Sterling Morton High Sch., Dist. 201, Cook Cty., IL, 830 F.2d 789, 790 (7th Cir.
1987).
130 Thompson, supra note 6, at 52.
131 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a), (e) (2017).
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specific third parties who are generally in a better position to access the related
information.
However, when other factors are not controlled, deviations from the
principle are possible. Even with its lower level of knowledge, such as merely
suspecting crime, a third party could be required to report the crime. Fewer
alternatives to expose the crime and greater good caused by reporting, are more
likely to trigger mandatory reporting by a third party, even when knowledge of
the crime is not certain. In other words, these other culpability factors lower the
required level of knowledge to justify a reporting requirement. For instance,
under 31 U.S.C. § 5318 and its accompanying regulations, reporting is required
even without complete knowledge when a third party “[detects] suspected
Federal criminal violation, or pattern of criminal violations”132 or “suspects, or
has reason to suspect [money laundering or violation of Bank Secrecy Act].”133
The willful violation of the duty to report is criminalized by “[fine] not more than
$250,000, or [imprisonment] for not more than five years, or both.”134
It is not clear, however, due to a lack of specificity regarding the types of
crime to be reported, whether the lower threshold for knowledge about the crime
is outweighed by either a lack of alternatives to expose the crime or by a high
level of good resulting from the reporting. For the deviation to be justified, one
must know what the crime being reported is in order to evaluate whether
alternatives to expose it exist and how much good will result from reporting it.
With respect to the good caused by reporting, financial institutions
should be able to determine the monetary loss associated with a particular crime
though it may be difficult or even practically impossible to evaluate all of the
consequences of a particular crime. For crimes involving very large sums of
money, the good caused (or harm mitigated) by reporting is great and, thus, may
outweigh the lower level of knowledge about the crime by the reporter in
satisfying the highest immorality of non-reporting requirement. Although it is
difficult to quantify a monetary threshold that would justify mandatory reporting,
even assuming the third party’s lower level of knowledge, the interaction
between these two factors is reflected in the suspicious activity report regulation,
12 C.F.R. 21.11(2)-(3). That regulation requires financial institutions to report
known or suspected crime by varying the monetary threshold involved in
suspected transaction in accordance to the level of knowledgeabout the crime.135
In contrast, as discussed above, for crimes committed by an insider, the
regulation, 12 C.F.R. 21.11(1), does not demand any monetary threshold to
trigger the duty to report because financial institutions have constructive, if not
actual, knowledge about the crime.136

13212

C.F.R. § 21.11 (c)(1)-(3) (2017).
12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (c)(4) (2017); 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320 (a)(2) (2017).
134 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2017).
13512 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(2)-(3) (2017).
136 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(1) (2017).
133
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In addition, for certain crimes, such as victimless crimes, where there are
few alternative sources to expose the crime, if any, other than a third party
reporter, a lack of complete knowledge about the crime could be outweighed by
the absence of alternatives. Money laundering or violation of the Bank Secrecy
Act are crimes where there are no victims around to report the crime. 12 C.F.R.
21.11 (c)(4) separates such crimes from general crimes and applies lower
standards in triggering the duty to report such crimes. It requires reporting when
a financial institution has only a reason to suspect and establishes a lower
monetary threshold than for general crimes where the financial institutions’ level
of knowledge is the same or higher.137 Unlike money laundering or violation of
the Bank Secrecy Act, other victimless crimes, such as certain drug crimes, are
not covered by 12 C.F.R. 21.11 (c)(4). However, considering the public’s general
agreement as to the seriousness of those crimes together with the absence of
alternative sources to expose them, it is morally justifiable to apply a similarly
low standard.
Information possessed by a third party reporter often is not independently
sufficient to prove the existence of a crime. It is usually necessary to gather
additional information from outside sources. Often, essential outside sources—
which are maintained by the government, the very entity imposing the duty to
report crimes on private parties—are not available to those same private parties.
In order to justify the criminalization of third-party non-compliance with
a duty to report, the government should provide all information in its possession
necessary for that third-party reporter to satisfy his or her duty to report crime.
Doing so will raise the third party’s level of knowledge about the crime and will
also lower the level of reporter harm by cutting the information gathering cost. It
will also decrease harm to the individual being reported by decreasing the
possibility of erroneous reporting.
In relation to the duty to report child pornography, NCMEC shares its
own information with private third party reporters. Among the material shared is
a list of MD5 hash values, through its Hash Value Sharing Initiative, which
“represent the "worst of the worst" images of apparent child pornography” and a
list of URLs for active Web pages, through its URL Initiative, “containing
apparent child pornography.” 138 This sharing of information with private third
party reporters was not explicitly authorized at first, but has been since 2007.139

13712

C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(4)(i)-(ii) (2017).
THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN,ANNUAL REPORT 2013
(2013),http://www.missingkids.org/Exploitation/Industry (last visited July. 7, 2016); see also 18
U.S.C. § 2258C (2017).
139 The original U.S. Code sections which imposed a duty to report child pornography on Internet
Service Providers, 42 U.S.C § 13032 and 42 U.S.C. § 5773, did not include information-sharing
clauses. SeeA STAFF REPORT FOR THE USE OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 109TH
CONG., SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN OVER THE INTERNET 8 (Jan. 2007),
http://burgess.house.gov/uploadedfiles/subcommittee%20on%20oversight%20and%20investigation
s%20report%20on%20the%20sexual%20exploitation%20of%20children%20over%20the%20inter
net.doc.
138
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In contrast, regarding the duty of financial institutions to report
suspicious activities, sharing of government information with private, third-party
reporters is lacking. 140 Although 31 C.F.R. Part 1010.520 seems to encourage
public-private information sharing, 141 such sharing is merely subject-specific
information sharing adopted only to investigate and detect the financial
transactions of suspects whose alleged crimes are already under investigation by
the government. The government’s failure to share information with financial
institutions, when it pertains to reporting suspicious activity, is problematic. The
government permits some third-party reporters to choose to remain ignorant
about the crime so that duty to report crimes is not triggered, as in the case of the
duty to report child pornography.142 On the other hand, other third party reporters
are mandated to establish investigative procedures, as in the investigative role
imposed on financial institutions to report suspicious activities. It is very difficult
to justify the government’s failure to provide information necessary for a more
effective investigation in one context (e.g. banking, where investigation is
required), when, in others, the government freely shares information with entities
without any such duty to investigate. Therefore, it is imperative for financial
institutions to have all relevant information since the law imposes mandatory
investigative duties and reporting obligations on those entities.
In addition, the sharing of government information with a third-party
reporter will diminish the harm to the reporter because the reporter will face a
lower cost of gathering, maintaining, and analyzing information to decide
whether (1) a crime happened, and (2) it was one that triggered the duty to report.
In relation to the duty to report child pornography, even when 18 U.S.C.
§ 2258A(f) does not require ISPs to monitor or affirmatively seek child
pornographers, representatives of many ISPs criticize reporting requirements
given the high cost incurred in the course of reporting143 and preserving144 the
related information.145 Although some ISPs voluntarily monitor their networks in

140 See

U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,314(B) FACT SHEET
(Oct. 2013), https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/pdf/314bfactsheet.pdf.
141 31 C.F.R. § 1010.520, adopted under the Section 314(a) of the PATRIOT Act, encourages
regulatory and law enforcement authorities to share with financial institutions information
regarding individuals, entities, and organizations engaged in or reasonably suspected of engaging in
terrorist acts or money laundering activities. Certain financial institutions are required to search
their records to determine whether they have information concerning the particular investigation.
See Id.
142 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(f) (2017) (denying electronic communication service provider’s proactive
duty of monitoring).
143 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(b) (2012) (requiring the report to the CyberTipline to include the
information about the involved individual, historical references, geographic location information,
images of apparent child pornography, and the complete communication containing any image of
apparent child pornography).
144 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(h) (2017).
145 SeeGOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-334, COMBATING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: STEPS
ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT TIPS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT ARE USEFUL AND FORENSIC
EXAMINATIONS ARE COST EFFECTIVE 16 (March 2011), http://www.tcco.texas.gov/docs/Combating-
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addition to mandatory reporting,146 the financial burden of doing so will be so
enormous that firms without strong finances will not be able to comply.147
Needless to say, as financial institutions are not only mandated to report
but also to investigate, they face additional compliance costs as compared to
general ISPs which have a limited role of reporting. Financial institutions face
serious financial burdens: to gather and maintain information by each risk
indicator; to screen the transactions based on that information; and to report hits
to FinCEN. For instance, M&T Bank spends approximately $3.3 million
annually on AML compliance.148 The BSA/AML compliance costs for financial
institutions was estimated at approximately $7 billion a year in 2007,149 and the
average growth rate of AML compliance costs from 2012-2014 was 53%.150
However, there are types of information that the government could
supply, but currently does not supply, at zero cost to financial institutions to
assist in the detection of suspicious financial transactions. One such piece of
information is the list of Politically Exposed Persons (hereinafter PEPs) who tend
to exhibit higher rates of corruption. One of the many investigatory functions
financial institutions perform is Customer Due Diligence,151 and Enhanced Due
Diligence is required for certain risky transactions including transactions
involving PEPs. 152 Though the definition and scope of PEPs differs by
Child-Pornography-2011.pdf (“According to officials from 4 of these 16 ESPs, devoting staff and
resources to review and report apparent child pornography can be costly. Officials from 1 ESP
reported that it cost $500,000 to develop a system to automate reporting to NCMEC . . .”).
146 For instance, Google voluntarily maintains a database of images of possible abuse, each of
which has a unique digital fingerprint. This database compares it with the images sent via Gmail
and reports the hits to the NCMEC Cyber Tipline. See Mark Hachman, How Google handles child
pornography in Gmail (Aug. 5, 2014, 10:34 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2461400/howgoogle-handles-child-pornography-in-gmail-search.html (last visited May 27, 2016).
147GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 144 (“Additionally, officials from 13 of the 19 ESPs
we spoke with said that establishing methods to detect apparent child pornography, while not
required, can be costly to implement. For example, 4 of these ESPs said it was costly to search for
key words, check their computer network for images, or provide users with a method to flag
images.”).
148Suspicious Activity and Currency Transaction Reports: Balancing Law Enforcement Utility and
Regulatory Requirements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H.
Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 22, 53 (2007) (testimony of Mr. Steve Bartlett, The
Financial Services Roundtable), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg37207/pdf/CHRG110hhrg37207.pdf.
149See Id. (citing Reginald J. Brown & Stephen R. Heifetz, Vague Guidance Still Invites Defensive
SARs, AMERICAN BANKER (2006)).
150
KPMG,
GLOBAL
ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING
SURVEY
2014
7
(2014),
https://www.kpmg.com/KY/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/PublishingImages/globalanti-money-laundering-survey-v3.pdf.
151 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l)(2)(A)-(C) (2017) (requiring financial institutions to verify the identity of
clients, to maintain records of such verification, and to consult lists of known or suspected terrorists
or terrorist organizations provided by any government agency).
152 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) (2017) (requiring financial institutions, when opening and
maintaining private banking and correspondent bank accounts involving foreign persons, to
ascertain the identity of the nominal and beneficial owners of, and the source of funds deposited
into, such account and to conduct enhanced scrutiny of any such account that is requested or
maintained by, or on behalf of, foreign PEPs.).

2017]

DEFENSE OF DUTY TO REPORT

395

jurisdiction,153 the common denominator of the various PEP definitions is that
most PEPs are public employees. Thus, the list of PEPs is the list of the
government’s own employees, and each government has an ability to provide
such a list to financial institutions at little cost. 154 However, an individual
financial institution is still on its own to gather information about PEPs, resulting
in large, unnecessary costs.155
A higher cost of reporting, in other words, magnifies harm to a thirdparty reporter, lowers the immorality of non-reporting, and makes it harder to
justify the criminalization of non-reporting. The sharing of government
information, which financial institutions would otherwise have to collect and
analyze at their own cost, will decrease costs incurred by third-party reporters,
thereby, eventually elevating immorality of non-reporting and justifiability of
criminalization of non-reporting.
Provision of government information to a third-party reporter also lowers
harm to the individual being reported and, indirectly, harm to a reporter who may

153

The PEP has various international definitions according to the United Nations, Financial Action
Task Force (hereinafter FATF), and the European Union. SeeTHEODORE S. GREENBERG, LARISSA
GRAY, ET AL., STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY, POLITICALLY EXPOSED PERSONS: A POLICY PAPER ON
STRENGTHENING
PREVENTIVE
MEASURES
79-80
(2009),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSARI/Resources/5570284-1257172052492/PEPsful.pdf?resourceurlname=PEPs-ful.pdf. In February 2012, a substantive discrepancy was reconciled
by including Domestic PEP into FATF Recommendations. SeeFATF, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, at 16 (Feb. 2012) (“Recommendation 12 – Politically exposed
persons”),
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf.
The
definitional variance is even greater where the domestic definition of PEP is concerned. In the US,
under 31 U.S.C. 5318, PEP is defined as “a senior foreign political figure, or any immediate family
member or close associate of a senior foreign political figure.” See U.S. TREASURY, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CO., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, & THE U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GUIDANCE ON
ENHANCED SCRUTINY FOR TRANSACTIONS THAT MAY INVOLVE THE PROCEEDS OF FOREIGN OFFICIAL
CORRUPTION
(Jan.
2001),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/guidance.aspx.
154 This paper does not propose the sharing of all governmental information regardless of its
content. The content of the information shared is essential in deciding whether the sharing should
be allowed under privacy law. However, this paper does not carry out the analysis of PEP
information from a privacy law perspective, as that would require deeper focus on privacy law and
distracts from the main idea of this paper. I believe there are types of private information which
could be legitimately shared with private entities under certain procedures and restrictions with the
help of technical solutions. Follow-up studies on a specific duty to report money laundering in
relation to corruption will analyze this privacy issue of PEP information sharing.
155 Financial institutions tend to rely on the PEP database services of commercial data providers,
such as World-Check, World Compliance, and Acuity. However, Commercial Data Providers’
service is expensive, and it could be a prohibitive burden on some financial institutions. SeeWORLD
COUNCIL OF CREDIT UNION, RE: CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: SOUND MANAGEMENT OF RISKS
RELATED TO MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCING OF TERRORISM 2 (Sept. 27, 2013),
https://www.woccu.org/documents/WOCCU_Basel_AML (expressing its concern with the
mandatory use of vendor-created PEP lists).
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face a lawsuit brought by the individual being reported based on erroneous
reporting. Harm to the individual being reported based on erroneous reporting
can stem from the third-party reporter’s necessarily limited knowledge about the
crime. By supplementing the third-party reporter’s knowledge with the
government information, the probability of erroneous reports will drop. This
diminishes the harm to the individual being reported and heightens the
immorality of non-reporting.
Apart from the sharing of government information with a third-party
reporter, the harm to the individual being reported should be minimized by
offering immunity from liability to a third-party reporter. For the duty to report
child pornography or suspicious activities, both ISPs 156 and financial
institutions157 should both be exempted from civil claims or criminal charges for
the reporting they made in good faith.
c. “Duties to Report” Crime Imposed on Victims
Considering that a victim is an individual who is harmed by crime, the
prevailing literature focuses on victims’ rights and protections. The duties of a
victim have not been widely researched, and imposing a duty to report crime on a
victim may sound absurd.158
In The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law, Victor Tadros, in explaining
reasons for the punishment of crime regardless of a victim’s wish, justifies
imposing a duty on the victim to see the offender punished when doing so incurs
only limited cost to the victim.159 He further measures “the strength of this duty
depend[ing] on the extent of the duty to protect others from harm and also on the
cost that the victim will bear if the offender is prosecuted.”160
The justifiability of imposing such duty on a victim is actually less
controversial than the proportionality and justifiability of criminal penalties for
non-compliance with such duty by a victim. As discussed above, criminalization
of non-reporting can be justified only when immorality of non-reporting is severe
enough to trigger the government’s strongest weapon: the criminal law. Thus,
higher good and lower harm to a victim are more essential for the criminalization
of non-reporting than for the imposition of such duty to be justified.
Furthermore, passing muster with respect to criminalization of nonreporting is particularly difficult in the case of a victim-reporter compared to
other reporters. Considering that criminalization inflicts additional harm on an
already-injured victim, even higher immorality of non-reporting is required to
justify criminalization of non-reporting by a victim-reporter.

156

18 U.S.C. § 2258B (2017).
31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2017).
158 VICTOR TADROS, THE ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 297 (Oxford
University U. Press, 2011).
159 Id. at 298.
160 Id.
157

2017]

DEFENSE OF DUTY TO REPORT

397

Accordingly, laws expressly criminalizing a victim who does not report
crime are rare. Only specific crimes with possible wide-spread, repeatable,
serious original and secondary harm should be controlled by law in such a
manner.
However, as a deviation from the above principle, financial institutions
are compelled to report any known or suspected federal criminal violation,
regardless of the characteristics of the crime, even when they are the victims.161
The only restrictions are that the aggregate violations must meet or exceed
$5,000 when a suspect can be identified, 162 $25,000 regardless of potential
suspects,163 or any amount where a suspect is an insider.164 Each of these duties
to report are imposed on financial institutions whether the reporter is a victim, a
third party, or an offender.
This deviation can be justified if the harm to the financial institution as a
victim-reporter is minimized through diverse protections such as prohibitions on
publication of reported information, or exemption from civil or administrative
liability caused by the reported information. However, the law does not
differentiate such protection by the position of the reporter, thereby failing to
reflect the varying immorality of non-reporting.
Other than the financial institution’s duty to report suspicious activity,
the laws imposing a duty to report on a victim and criminalizing non-compliance
with that duty specifically target the serious crimes with the characteristics
suggested above. Historically there was a tendency to penalize a victim’s nonreporting with sanctions less severe than full criminal penalties. This lowers the
required culpability of non-reporting. Nevertheless, Congress and government
agencies have increasingly tried to mandate victim reporting of certain crimes
under threat of criminal penalty.
Concerning reporting duties imposed on entity-victims of data breach
incidents,165 the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, the
federal law governing data breaches, penalizes health care providers for not
reporting information breaches with civil, not criminal, fines.166 State law varies,
but, under the Identity Theft Protection Act of North Carolina, the Attorney
General may bring a criminal prosecution167 for violating the duty to report data

161

All three subsections of 21.11(c) require a financial institution, as a victim of crime, to report
crime “[w]henever the national bank detects any known or suspected Federal criminal violation, or
pattern of criminal violations, committed or attempted against the bank . . . and where the bank
believes that it was either an actual or potential victim of a criminal violation, or series of criminal
violations.” See 12 C.F.R. 21.11 (c) (1), (2), (3) (2017).
162 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (c) (2) (2017).
163 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (c) (3) (2017).
164 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (c) (1) (2017).
165 The victim, in this sense, is the entity whose customers’ personal information is breached by the
offender, not the individual customer of the entity who is the subject of the information.
166 42 U.S.C. §1320d-5 (a) (2017).
167 N.C. GEN. STAT. §75-13 (2017) (“The Attorney General in carrying out the provisions of this
Chapter shall have a right to send bills of indictment before any grand jury in any county in which
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breaches. 168 Congress has proposed a new federal law, The Personal Data
Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2014, 169 expanding the scope of
reporting obligations to certain interstate business entities and criminalizing
intentional or willful concealment of data breaches with fines and/or
imprisonment of up to five years.170
With respect to cyber security, Congress has long debated whether
reporting cyber incidents should be mandatory171 instead of voluntary.172 In the
meantime, the Department of Defense (hereinafter DoD) recently reformed its
information sharing program by promulgating a new regulation enjoining DoD
contractors from reporting cyber incidents affecting covered contractor
information systems or covered defense information residing on those systems.173
Although the regulation does not specify penalties for non-compliance, criminal
liability is possible.174 In addition, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance
issued a warning that “[a]lthough no existing disclosure requirement explicitly
refers to cyber security risks and cyber incidents, a number of disclosure
requirements may impose an obligation on registrants to disclose such risks and
incidents.” 175 Thus, non-reporting of cyber incidents could trigger criminal
prosecution against the victim as a penalty for breaching the Securities Act of
it is alleged this Chapter has been violated or in any adjoining county, and may take charge of and
prosecute all cases coming within the purview of this Chapter . . . .”).
168N.C. GEN. STAT. §75-65 (2017) (imposing a duty to report data breaches).
169 Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2014, S.1995, 113th Cong. (20132014), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1995/text.
170
In contrast to the crime of misprision, which requires active concealment of a federal crime,
concealing of data breaches by the entities who have a duty to report such incidents is equivalent to
a failure to report data breaches.
171 See The Cybersecurity Act of 2010, S. 773, 111th Cong. (2010) §§ 3-4 (placing significant
reporting requirements in relation to cyber security breaches on private sector entities, particularly
critical infrastructure information systems); see alsoThe Cybersecurity Debate: Voluntary Versus
Mandatory Cooperation Between the Private Sector and the Federal Government, JONESDAY2-3,
(July
2013),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/49c491ff-7f05-4932-92872c07a131e83d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/216181fe-3cff-4535-92322c603c8bf48b/Cybersecurity%20Debate.pdf.
172 See Protecting Cyber Networks Act (PCNA), H.R. 1560, 114th Cong. (2015), the National
Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015 (NCPAA), H.R. 1731 114th Cong. (2015), and
the Cyber Security Information Act of 2015 (CISA), S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015) (all of them place
rules and procedures regarding the voluntary reporting of cyber security breaches on the private
sector). However, this legislation “does not prevent agencies, such as DOD and the Intelligence
Community from imposing separate reporting requirements on a regulatory and contractual basis.”
See Cassidy & Terenzio, supra note 107.
173 See 10 U.S.C. §391 (2017); 32 C.F.R. §236 (2017).
174 Chris Page, an attorney with Kaufman & Canoles specializing in Government Contracts, argues
that “[t]he scope of responsibility and potential liability is uncertain, but could include criminal or
civil action, negative past performance ratings, reduced profits or award fees, or termination of
contract.” Sera-Brynn and Kaufman & Canoles discuss DFARS and cybersecurity safeguards for
government contractors, SERA-BRYNN (Nov. 16, 2015), https://sera-brynn.com/sera-brynn-andkaufman-canoles-discuss-dfars-and-cybersecurity-safeguards-for-government-contractors/.
175 DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2 (October 13, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm.
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1933. 176 Besides the US, the European Union adopted the Network and
Information Security Directive which compels victims to report cyber
incidents, 177 and its E-privacy Directive puts those who fail to report data
breaches to national authorities at risk of criminal sanction.178
Considering this recent shift to mandatory reporting duties, it is
important to identify relevant moral principles and consider how they are or are
not reflected by current laws.
When considering a victim-reporter, the culpability factors “clear
knowledge about the crime” and “no harm to the individual being reported” both
raise the immorality of non-reporting issue. In addition, unlike a third-party
reporter, reporting of crime by a victim generally does not entail any
information-gathering cost, 179 thereby increasing the immorality of nonreporting.
However, crime reporting by a victim does involve a particular risk of
harm to the reporter mainly caused by the publication of the crime reported.
Harms to reporters include: the risk of reputational damage, which can affect
business outcomes; 180 the risk of penalties for not complying fully with
administrative requirements;181 the risk of shareholder suits for mismanagement
176

See Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2012) (“Any person who willfully . . . omits
to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading, shall upon conviction be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.”).
177See Art. 14 of the Directive 2016/1148, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July
2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems
across
the
Union,
2016
O.J.
(L
194)
1,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.194.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:194:TOC.
178See Art. 15a. of the Directive 2002/58/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic
communications
sector,
2002
O.J.
(L
201)
37,
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2002L0058:20091219:EN:HTML.
179 When the harm caused by crime manifests, a victim could detect crime without any cost.
However, depending on the type of crime, the time gap between its commission and the
manifestation its of harm differs. For instance, crimes such as cyber-incidents or data breaches have
a longer time gap. Those criminals use highly complicated, covert tactics to cause more harm over
an undetected period. Thus, for a victim to detect crime earlier and to minimize the harm, a victim
must expend resources to gather and analyze appropriate information. However, even in this
situation, the cost of reporting should still be lower for a victim-reporter than a third-party reporter
because victims often have more intimate knowledge of the crime.
180 See Emily R. Caron, Target Data Breach and NIST Cybersecurity Framework Raise Tough
&
GAGE
LLP
1-2,
(Feb.
18,
2014),
Insurance
Questions,
LATHROP
https://law.ku.edu/sites/law.ku.edu/files/docs/media_law/2014/Media_Privacy_Beyond.pdf.
(“Analysts estimate that Target’s profit per share slumped 47 percent in the three months through
January, the biggest quarterly decline since 2006. Earnings for the financial year slid 32 percent,
making this the worst annual performance since at least 1987.”); see also supra note 96.
181 Cyber Security Task Force: Public-Private Information Sharing, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER,
July 2012, at 15, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/PublicPrivate%20Information%20Sharing.pdf. (“Some companies are reluctant to disclose information
about data breaches to the federal government for fear of FTC enforcement action. . . An FTC
enforcement action following a security breach is very costly for companies. From beginning to
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or by the persons whose information was compromised;182 and the risk of abuse
of publicized information by would-be intruders.183
Thus, to minimize these harms and to satisfy the highest immorality
requirement, guiding principles require that the crime reported by a victim should
not be publicized.
However, deviations are permitted when there are no other means to
expose the crime or when the good caused by reporting the crime (or the harm
mitigated by reporting) together outweigh the harm to a reporter. That is, crimes
reported by victims should be publicized only in exceptional circumstances.
Furthermore, victim-reported crimes should only be published to a limited extent,
scope, and purpose, and should be buttressed by penalties for abuse of released
information.
For instance, in the case of DoD contractors’ duty to report cyber
incidents, the regulation obliges government to “protect against the unauthorized
use or release of information obtained from the contractor (or derived from
information obtained from the contractor) under this part that includes contractor
attributional/proprietary information”184 and “[i]n making an authorized release
of such information, . . . [to] implement appropriate procedures to minimize the
contractor attributional/proprietary information . . . [and] to include only that
information that is necessary for the authorized purpose(s) for which the
information is being released.” 185 In addition, the law “prohibits the
dissemination outside the DoD of information obtained or derived through such
procedures that is not created by or for the Department except with the approval
of the contractor providing such information.”186 Even for requests made under
the Freedom of Information Act, sensitive, nonpublic information will be
protected by asserting applicable exemptions. 187 Furthermore, the regulation
allows information disclosure outside DoD only to specific entities or for specific
end, the investigation and enforcement action can take over two years and cost millions of dollars
in legal and consulting fees. Further, the FTC often imposes obligations on the company that last
decades into the future.”); see also supra note 97.
182 See Caron,supra note 179, at 1. The Target case has spawned nearly 70 class action lawsuits.
Seeid.; see also supra notes 98 and 99.
183 See Music Grp. Macao Commercial Offshore Ltd. v. Foote, No. 14-CV-03078-JSC, 2015 WL
3993147, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2015) (“Westbrook identifies categories of information that an
individual may use to perpetrate a cyber attack, including: (1) identification of a particular
vulnerability in a company's systems or software; (2) knowledge of the software or vendor of
security software used; and (3) “social engineering”—i.e., gaining the trust of a company insider to,
in turn, gain access to the company's software.”).
184 32 C.F.R. § 236.2 (2017). (Attributional/proprietary information is “information that identifies
the contractor(s), whether directly or indirectly, by the grouping of information that can be traced
back to the contractor(s) (e.g., program description, facility locations), personally identifiable
information, as well as trade secrets, commercial or financial information, or other commercially
sensitive information that is not customarily shared outside of the company.”).
185 32 C.F.R. § 236.4 (l) (2017).
186 National Defense Authorization of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 941(C)(3), 126 Stat. 1632, 1890 (2013).
187 32 C.F.R. § 236.4 (p) (2017).
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purposes.188 When information is disclosed to a support service contractor, strict
use and non-disclosure rules apply with possible criminal and civil penalties for
breaches.189
Such protections are designed to boost crime reporting by victims
regardless of whether the reporting is mandatory or voluntary.190 However, for
the duties to report under threat of criminal sanctions, protections against
publication should be mandatory and underpinned by serious penalties against
unauthorized publication in order to minimize harm to the victim-reporter. Only
then can one satisfy the highest immorality requirement. In contrast, for
voluntary reporting, those protections should be encouraged or required but with
less severe consequences for unauthorized publication if the reporting was
anonymous and voluntary. After all, this type of report carries the reporter’s
implied consent.
However, unlike the duty to report cyber incidents, laws regulating the
duty to report data breaches do not provide such protections even when noncompliance with the duty is criminalized. 191 Though it does not reflect the
principle I suggested, one can justify this deviation from non-protection when
reporting achieves more social good than harm, and when such non-protection
does not cause additional harm to the reporter.
Retributive and deterrent good caused by reporting are higher in data
breach reporting than in cyber incident reporting, assuming the same attack is
used against an institution. Originally, cyber incidents only harm the interest of
the entity-victim against whom a cyber attack is committed. In contrast, a data
breach harms the entity whose system is breached and individual customers
whose data is compromised. In addition, reporting cyber incidents might deter
similar subsequent attacks against other entities. Dissimilarly, though, reporting
data breaches will discourage both subsequent attacks and the abuse of
compromised personal information.
In addition, protections from publication of the data breaches reported to
government authorities will not decrease harm to the reporter. With respect to a
victim-reporter, more so than for a third party or offender reporter, harm to the
reporter is based on the publication of the crime reported. Therefore, the absence
of alternative means to expose the crime affects the weight of the harm to the
reporter factor. When alternative means to expose crime exist, the crime will be
publicized by that alternative sources even if the government does not.
Furthermore, to maximize deterrence (i.e., good caused by reporting), entity188

See 32 C.F.R. § 236.4 (m) (1)-(4) (2017).
32 C.F.R. § 236.4 (m) (5) (2017).
190 See 6 U.S.C. § 133 (a)(1)(A) (2017) (exempting from disclosure under FOIA “critical
infrastructure information (including the identity of the submitting person or entity) that is
voluntarily submitted to a covered Federal agency for use by that agency regarding the security of
critical infrastructure and protected systems . . .”); see also 32 C.F.R. § 236.6 (2017) (protecting
“the [c]onfidentiality of information that is exchanged under the DoD–DIB CS information sharing
program . . . to the maximum extent authorized by law, regulation, and policy.”).
191 N.C. GEN. STAT. §75-65 (e1) (2017).
189
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victims must provide direct notice to individual customers whose information has
been breached. Laws requiring entity victims to report data breaches to
government authorities also dictate such notice to individual customers.192 This,
in turn, intensifies the futility of protection from publication by the government.
Also, to minimize the harm to the reporter, victim-reporters should not
face liability stemming from the release of the reported information. A victim
reporter should have immunity from enforcement actions by other government
agencies prompted by the reporting of information.
According to a DoD regulation, “information obtained from the
contractor (or derived from information obtained from the contractor) under this
part that is created by or for DoD (including the [cyber incident reporting]) is
authorized to be used and released outside of DoD . . . for any other lawful
government purpose or activity.”193 However, if “any other lawful government
purpose or activity” includes enforcement actions initiated by the reported
information (even those initiated by other government agencies), it will cause
serious harm to the reporter, thereby lowering the immorality of non-reporting.
Regarding data breach reporting, while the Identity Theft Protection Act of North
Carolina criminalizes non-compliance with the duty to report, it does not provide
immunity from administrative liabilities. This harm is an actual risk for a victim
reporter, as the cyber incident or data breach reported by a victim proves the
victim’s inadequate security system, thereby triggering the FTC’s enforcement
actions based on unfair practices under Section 5 of the FTC.194
However, deviation from the principle of exemption from administrative
liabilities should be permitted when reporting is in society’s best interest.
Because more good comes from data breach reporting than from cyber incident
reporting, this deviation generally will be more difficult to justify for cyber
incident reporting duty than for data breach reporting duty.
In addition, it is vital to immunize victim-reporters from civil suits
triggered by the release of information derived from the victim’s report. Proposed
cyber security laws designed to encourage voluntary cyber incident reporting all
provide immunity from such civil actions. 195 However, the DoD regulation

192

See Security Breach Notification Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb.
24, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/securitybreach-notification-laws.aspx. (“Forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto
Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted legislation requiring private, governmental or educational
entities to notify individuals of security breaches of information involving personally identifiable
HOSTETLER
LLP,
information.”);
See
also
Data
Breach
Charts,
BAKER
http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20documents/Data_Breach_
Charts.pdf.
193 32 C.F.R. § 236.4 (n) (2017).
194 See
In re ACRAnet, Inc., FTC File No. 092 3088, February 3, 2011,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923088/index.shtm; In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. FTC File
No.042 3160, June 16, 2005, www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/bjswholesale.htm.
195
See Protecting Cyber Networks Act (PCNA), H.R. 1560, 114th Cong. (2015), National
Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015 (NCPAA), H.R. 1731 114th Cong. (2015); see
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mandating crime reporting provides no such protection. Although the DoD
regulation does not specify a penalty for non-compliance, protection of a victim
reporter is encouraged in order to minimize the harm to the reporter. Stronger
penalties for non-reporting necessitate immunity from civil liability. If DoD
regulations criminalize non-compliance with the duty to report crime, exemption
from civil liability will be necessary—not simply encouraged—to justify such
criminalization. Concerning data breach reporting, under the Identity Theft
Protection Act of North Carolina, an individual customer injured as a result of a
violation of the act has a right to take private action. 196 In light of secondary
victims of data breaches whose information is misappropriated, as analyzed
above, the good caused by reporting data breaches is stronger than good caused
by reporting cyber incidents. This benefit could outweigh the harm to a reporter
caused by civil liability and, accordingly, justifies deviation from the principle of
civil liability exemption.
V. CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper is to suggest a theoretical framework to
comprehend and refine the current state of laws that create a duty to report crime
and carry criminal penalties for failing to report. For those laws to be justified
under the culpability analysis of this paper, the failure being criminalized must
satisfy the highest culpability. Thus, this study identifies circumstantial factors
(i.e., culpability factors) governing the culpability of non-reporting. The
reporter’s position with respect to the crime reported—offenders, third parties, or
victims—significantly varies the culpability of non-reporting. By categorizing
duties to report based on these positions, I propose substantive principles and
corresponding modifications to each category of laws to enhance their
justifiability. Deviations from the suggested principles can be justified for certain
reporting duties, but only if it properly reflects a different level of culpability.

also Cyber Security Information Act of 2015 (CISA), S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015) (Essentially
protecting entities from liability if they have acted in good faith compliance with the law).
196 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65 (i) (2017).

